Enfranchisement of a service inam creates a new title in the grantee, and adverse possession cannot succeed against the rights of the grantees under the title-deed.

Wallace, J.

1. The plaintiff, the seventh defendant and another were the sons of one Bayyapuraju. The plaint property was a mirasi karnam inam enfranchised in the names of the seventh defendant, the plaintiff and Suryanarayana, who were the three sons of Bayyapuraju, and the first defendant, who is the brother of Bayyapuraju. Suryanarayana died long ago. The plaintiff sued for one half share in the property on the footing that first defendant had no right in it. The first defendant relied on a family arrangement in 1905 in which the plaintiff and the. seventh defendant gave up their third shares to the first defendant. The District Munsif upheld that arrangement and dismissed the suit on the ground that the first defendant had been in adverse possession for more than 12 years since 1905. In the lower appellate Court it was argued that, as the enfranchisement of the inam was in 1911, the property was until then the absolute property of Government, that the first defendant, if he was from 1905 to 1911 prescribing for a title for adverse possession, could so prescribe against Government only and had not completed such title, that no adverse possession was running from 1905 against the plaintiff since the plaintiffs title only began in 1911, and that the title of any of the grantees under the Inam title deed began only on the date of the enfranchisement, namely in 1911. The lower appellate Court accepted that argument, and gave a decree for plaintiff. The first defendant appeals.

2. There are two main lines of argument for the appellant, first, that enfranchisement and grant of an inam title deed mean nothing more than a removal of the service obligation on the land and does not in any way affect the manner in which the land was previously held or affect the rights of those previously holding it, whether members of the service holders family or outsiders; and secondly that, even if it be held that the inam title deed implies total resumption by Government and re-grant that re-grant will not avail to disturb the pre-existing rights in the land, of persons not claiming any title or spes in the office, and, particularly will not rid the land of any right in the land acquired by outsiders by adverse possession. These points were argued on the assumption that, if the enfranchisement does not avail to break the running of the adverse possession in favour of the first defendant, then the first defendants title by adverse possession is perfected.

3. On the first point I am quite clear that it cannot now be considered good law in the face of the Privy Council pronouncement in Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabhadrayya (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 643 : 41 M.L.J. 1 (P.C.). That decision interpreted an inam title deed of exactly the same terms as the present one and of almost the same date. It lays down clearly that the lands comprising the emoluments of the karnam office are attached to the office as such, so that, even if a stranger to the family is appointed, the land goes with the appointment, that eligibility to the office is a personal matter, that the land goes with the office and is impartibly, and that Government, in the act of enfranchisement, severs the land from the office and allows the office-holder for the time being to enfranchise it. The Full Bench ruling in Venkata v. Rama (1884) ILR 8 Mad 249 and other rulings which have followed it are approved in that decision, and other rulings of this Court which do not follow Venkata v. Rama (1884) ILR 8 Mad 249 for example Gunnaiyan v. Kamakshi Iyer (1902) ILR 26 Mad 339 and Pingala Lakshmipathi v. Bommireddipalli Chalamayya (1906) ILR 30 Mad 434 : 17 MLJ 101 are disapproved of. The whole trend of that decision was set out and relied on in Second Appeal No. 287 of 1921 in this Court, with which I respectfully agree. It was there clearly pointed out that the distinction between the enfranchisement of a service inam and that of a personal inam is that the latter is a mere release of the servic