The main legal point established in the judgment is that the conversion of ryoti land into private land is restricted by the statutory law, and the rights and interests created over the land are subject to the statutory rights of relinquishment by the tenant. Additionally, the Court clarified the representation of the kudivaram interest and the binding nature of mortgage suits on the parties involved.

Sadasiva Ayyar, J.

1. The First defendant is the appellant. He is zamindar of the Mirzapuram Estate, and the plaintiff being the person who purchased a holding in the estate from the purchaser in a Court auction-sale held in 1909 in execution of the mortgage decree for sale passed in Original Suit No. 229 of 1906 on the file of the District Munsifs Court of Bezwada against the legal representatives of the original tenant of the holding (by name P. Venkayya), who had executed the mortgage, deed in 1894. This suit was brought for possession of the lands comprised in the holding, as the first defendants father (then zamindar) obstructed the plaintiffs enjoyment in 1910.

2. The first defendant pleaded (among other defences):

(a) that the original tenant relinquished the land to the defendants father in 1894 [see paragraph 2 of the written statement. At the trial, Fasli 1307 (or 1897-98) seems to have been mentioned as the date of the relinquishment];

(b) that the land has Been thereafter enjoyed by the zamindar as his home-farm land;

(c) that the zamindar dfd not know of the mortgage of 1894 and was not impleaded in the Suit No. 229 of 1906 instituted long after the relinquishment (of 1897-8) and hence the first defendant was not bound by the decree and sale in execution in that suit.

3. The District Munsif found (among other conclusions) that the lands were the home-farm lands of the first defendant owing to a "general relinquishment of all the lands in the suit village of Kesarapalli in fasli 1307" by all the ryots of that village and that the mortgage decree was not binding on the first defendant. He therefore dismissed the suit.

4. The Subordinate Judge on Appeal gave the following findings:

(a) It is clear in this case that the land was seri (rjoti) land, and it was relinquished under the Estates Land Act; the land which was known to be seri land cannot be converted into kamatam land, by the zamindar. I have no doubt that the land is seri land and not the kamatam land of the zamindar.

(b) The relinquishment by Venkayya cannot affect the mortgage created in 1894. I find therefore that the relinquishment by Venkayya (if any) will not affect the right of the mortgagee.

5. On these (and other) findings, the Subordinate Judge substantially decreed the plaintiffs suit. Hence this Second Appeal by the first defendant. Though several grounds are mentioned in the Memorandum of Second Appeal, the arguments urged before us bythe learned vakil for the second appellant were confined to the contention that the lower (Appellate) Court entirely overlooked the fact that the zamindar was not a party to the mortgage suit (of 1906)(sixth ground of Appeal). The learned vakil did not seriously dispute the finding that the land had continued to be ryoti land but argued as follows (expanding, if I may say so, the above sixth ground of Appeal): (1) that the relinquishment of fasli 1307 by Venkayya made the zamindar the owner of the kudivaram interest; (2) that the zamindar therefore was the proper person to be impleaded as defendant in the mortgage suit of 1906 and not Venkayyas legal representatives, the zamindar then representing the owner of the kudivaram right and the right of redemption; (3) that the decree passed and the Court auction-sale held behind the back of the zamindar did not bind him and could therefore be ignored by him and (4) that the plaintiff as Court auction-purchaser (in a suit to which the owner entitled then to possession was not made a party) could not claim larger rights than the original simple mortgagee who had no rights as such to possession; and hence the plaintiffs suit for possession ought to have been dismissed.

6. I think that the lower Appellate Court does seem to have ignored the fact that the zamindar was not a party to the suit of 1906. He was therefore clearly not bound by the decree and sale proceedings therein. On the other hand (as pointed out by the respondents learned vakil) the lower Appellate Court has not