The compensation provided under the Schedule was in furtherance of the avowed object to be achieved under Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution, and therefore protected by Article 31(C) of the Constitution.

In both these Writ Petitions, the challenge is to the order of the first respondent dated 26-12-1994 in KP 80/94/KBK, determining the amount of compensation payable to the petitioner as specified in Schedule-II of the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Conferment of Ownership) Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu 40 of 1971) and amended Act 39/90 vested in the Kudiyiruppudars.

2. Though initially, the challenge was on the ground that the compensation was not rightly fixed, by W.P.M.P. Nos. 146 and 147 of 2004, the petitioner raised a question of constitutional validity of the provisions contained in Schedule-I of the above said Act.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that while under the above said Act, the rights of ownership of the land of the petitioner have been done away with, the compensation prescribed under the Schedule-I based on the survey assessment is ‘illusory’ in nature, therefore the said Schedule is liable to be set aside.

4. At the outset, it is required to be stated that the petitioner has not raised any other challenge on any other aspect in these Writ Petitions. In support of the above submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court reported in “AIR 1965 SC 1017 ( P. Vajravelu Mudaliar and others v. The Special Deputy Collector For Land Acquisition, West Madras and another )”, and contended that the Legislature cannot make a law in derogation of Article 300-A of the Constitution, that a law of acquisition should provide for ‘adequate compensation’ and if the Legislature makes a law for acquiring a property by providing for an ‘illusory compensation’ or by indicating the principles for ascertaining the compensation which do not relate to the property acquired or to the value of such property at or within reasonable proximity of the date of acquisition or the principles are so designed and so arbitrary that they do not provide compensation at all, it will have to be held that the Legislature made the law in fraud of its powers.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that since the Schedule to the Act empowers the Authorised Officer to determine the compensation based on the survey assessment, and any compensation so determined on that basis would be wholly ‘illusory’, the said Schedule should be held to be unconstitutional violating Article 14 and 300(A) of the Constitution.

6. As against the above submissions, learned Advocate General contended that Act 40 of 1971 is intended to advance the cause of agriculturists and agricultural labourers as a part of agrarian reforms, that by virtue of Article 31(C) of the Constitution, since the present enactment would fall within the ambit of Clause (b) and (c) of the Article 39 of the Constitution, any argument of contravention of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution will be of no avail. The learned Advocate General placed heavy relia nce upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in “1985 Writ L.R. (Suppl.) 1 ( His Holiness Sri La Sri Ambalavuna Pandora Sannadhi Avergal, Adheena Karthar, Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenum & Others v. The Site Of Tamil Nadu By Secretary To Government, Law Department, Madras-9 & Others )”, wherein, the Division Bench of this Court held that the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Amendment Act (17 of 1980) and Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Amendment Act (18 of 1980) would be a law to give effect to the State policy towards securing the principles set out in Clause (b) and (c) of the Article 39 of the Constitution. According to the learned Advocate General, in the light of the Division Bench Judgment which considered Art icle 31(C) as well as 300 (A) of the Constitution and held that even 300(A) which confers only a legal right cannot be read as overriding the constitutional immunity granted under Article 31(C), the Act should be held to be valid. It was also c