The expression 'santhathi' in the Will referred to legal heirs and not just issues, and the defendants were rightfully entitled to the office of trusteeship.

1. The second defendant is the appellant in this appeal. One Arunachalam Pillai, who was previously the owner of the suit properties, executed a Will on 25.9.1929. Under the said will he gave the properties described in A schedule thereto to one Vadivel who was his fathers brothers grandson and to one Sivagurunathan, who was a great grandson of his fathers brother. The said property was to be taken by them absolutely. B schedule properties were given to some persons as trustees for utilising the income therefrom for performing certain charities. C schedule properties were given by him to his wife to be taken by her absolutely. In this appeal we are not concerned with either A or C schedule properties. The only property in dispute is the B schedule properties which are described in the first schedule to the plaint.

2. Arunachalam died in 1930 and his wife Parvathi died in 1940, Vadivel died in 1935 and Sivagurunathan died in 1943. After the death of Sivagurunathan, his wife Pattu Achi was in enjoyment and management of one portion of the properties and the other portion was in the management and enjoyment of two sons of Vadivel by name Sadasivam and Thiagarajan who are the plaintiffs in the present suit out of which the Second Appeal arises.

3. According to the plaintiffs, after the death of Sivagurunathan the entirety of the B schedule properties were to be taken over by them and managed as trustees. But with their permission a portion of the properties was being managed by Pattu Achi during her life time. It is the plaintiffs contention that Pattu Achi had no right whatever to bequeathe the properties to anybody as she was only a permissive occupant on their behalf. For the purpose of claiming exclusive right of trusteeship to the properti es, the plaintiffs contend that the terms of the Will executed by Arunachalam which is marked as Exhibit A-1 provided that after the death of Vadivel and Sivagurunathan, their respective Santhathis were to take over the properties, manage the same and perform the trust. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the expression “santhathi” used in Exhibit A-1 would only mean the “descendants” or the children of the person concerned and will not by any sense of the term refer to the heirs of the said per son. On that footing the plaintiffs prayed for a decree for possession. At the time when they filed the suit, Pattu Achi was alive and she was made the first defendant in the suit. The second defendant in the suit was Sivaprakasam who is the appellant herein. He was impleaded as a party to the suit since Pattu Achi claimed that she had already executed a will whereby the properties had been given to Sivaprakasam for management as trustee. Defendants 4 and 5 are the tenants in the suit property and the third defendant has been impleaded as a person who had entered into contract for purchasing sugarcane grown on the suit properties. We are not really concerned with defendants 3 to 5 in this appeal.

4. Pattu Achi died within a few days after the filing of the suit. In the written-statement the second defendant contended that under the Will of Arunachalam, the properties devolved on the respective heirs of Vadivel and Sivagurunathan and as such heir, Pattu Achi had a right to nominate her successor trustee which she did by executing a Will giving the properties to him and appointing him as a trustee. The second defendant also pleaded that Pattu Achi had perfected title to trusteeship by adverse possession and therefore, the suit was not sustainable. Another contention was raised that the suit was bad for non-joinder of other parties who would be entitled to trusteeship.

5. The trial court dismissed the suit accepting the contention of the defendants that the expression “Santhathi” would only mean the legal heirs. The trial court has also held that the plaintiffs could not claim right of trusteeship to the properties described in second schedule to the plaint as there was an arrangement