In a petition for eviction under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the landlord must plead and prove that the person for whose benefit the premises is required has no other non-residential building of his own in the same city.

1. This Revision Petition is preferred by the tenants in rent control proceedings, aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority.

2. The respondents herein as landlords filed R.C.O. No. 1 of 1985, on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Perambulur, for eviction of one Ramalingam Pillai and one Nagarajan, respectively father and son, on the grounds that the premises in their occupation was required for their own use and occupation, and that the said Ramalingam Pillai has unauthorisedly sub-let the premises in favour of Nagarajan.

3. In view of the fact that the ground of sub-letting was not accepted by both the authorities below, we are now concerned only with the case of bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlords for their own use and occupation.

4. While dismissing the case of the landlords for eviction on the ground of sub-letting, both the Authorities below have allowed the eviction petition on the ground of requirement for own use and occupation.

5. The said Ramalingam Pillai died pending disposal of this Revision Petition and the second petitioner herein has been recorded as legal representative of the said Ramalingam Pillai, and petitioners 3 to 8 have been brought on record as other legal representatives of the deceased Ramalinga Pillai as per the Order in C.M.P. Nos. 1398 and 1399 of 1991.

6. The point that was urged before me by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners was that the necessary pleadings for invoking S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) are not there, and that there is also no evidence to substantiate the requirement of the landlords under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. In other words, one of the requirements for invoking S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is conspicuously absent in the petition for eviction.

7. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents/landlords that in the petition for eviction, there is no averment to the effect that the son of the first respondent herein does not own any non-residential premises of his own to enable the landlords to invoke S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. In the evidence also, the first respondents son, as P.W. 1 has merely stated that he has no other place and he has no other shop except the suit shop. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the absence of any necessary pleading, the order of eviction under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be sustained. Assuming that the first respondents son as P.W. 1 has said something in the evidence, that will not help him in the absence of any pleading. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad 1981 3 S.C.C. 103 and also two decisions of this court in A.N. Shanmuga Sundaram Mudaliar and 4 others v. A.P. Mani 1992 T.L.N.J. 110 and Yousuff Sait & Sons v. A. Shafeed Ahmea 100 L.W. 278.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents/landlords, however, submitted that though there is no pleading, in as much as the son of the first respondent herein as P.W. 1 has stated that he does not own any other premises of his own and that the demised premises was required for his use, it must be taken that the requirement of S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is satisfied. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the following decisions:—

Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lalwani 1980 1 S.C.C. 290 v. V. Raliah 1989-1-L.W. 123.

8. I have considered the rival submissions.

9. It is common ground that there was no pleading to the effect that P.W. 1 for whose benefit the suit premises was bona fide required, has no other non-residential building of his own in the same city. Of course, he has vaguely stated in the evidence that he does not own any other shop.

10. In (1981) 3 S.C.C. 103 (supra), the Supreme Court has stated, under similar circumstances, as f