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2012 Supreme(Mad) 2704
High Court of Judicature at Madras
R.S. RAMANATHAN, J.
Rabiammal Ahamed Maideen Educational Trust, A Public Charitable Trust represented by its Secretary and Correspondent, S.M. Miskeem & Others
Versus
K.A. Ahamed Maideen, Represented by his Power Agent N.M.A. Noor Maideen & Others
S.A.No.437 of 2008 & M.P.No.1 of 2008
Decided on : 29-06-2012
For the Appellants:T.V. Krishnamachari, Senior Counsel for T.V. Ramanujam, Advocate.
For the Respondents:R1 to R6 - T.R. Rajagopalan, Senior Counsel for T.R. Rajaraman, Advocate.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 92 of CPC and the Wakf Act, 1995, in determining the maintainability of the suit and the legality of the actions taken by the Trust and its founders.
Headnote:
Wakf - Public Charitable Trust - Wakf Act, 1995 - Section 3(4) - Summary of the Acts and Sections: The court discussed the applicability of the Wakf Act, 1995, specifically Section 3(4) in relation to the definition of 'Wakf' and the nature of the trust in question. The court also analyzed the provisions of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and its application to the suit filed, highlighting the conditions necessary for the application of Section 92.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiffs filed a suit seeking declaration that the first plaintiff is a Public Charitable Trust, challenging the legality of a Supplementary Trust Deed and the removal of the plaintiffs from their positions in the Trust. The defendants contended that the suit was not maintainable under Section 92 of CPC and that the Trust was under mismanagement by the plaintiffs.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the suit was maintainable and not barred under Section 92 of CPC. It held that the removal of the plaintiffs from their positions in the Trust was illegal and not valid. The court also determined that the Trust did not fall under the definition of 'Wakf' as per the Wakf Act, 1995.
Issues: The issues revolved around the maintainability of the suit under Section 92 of CPC, the legality of the Trust's actions in executing the Supplementary Trust Deed, and the removal of the plaintiffs from their positions in the Trust.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the provisions of Section 92 of CPC and the Wakf Act, 1995. It also relied on the specific clauses of the original Trust Deed and the Supplementary Trust Deed to determine the legality of the actions taken by the Trust and the founders.
Final Decision: The second appeal was partly allowed, and the suit was partly decreed in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the Trust as a Public Charitable Educational Trust and ruling the removal of the plaintiffs from their positions as illegal. The relief sought regarding the Supplementary Trust Deed was dismissed. The court granted an injunction restraining interference with the management and administration of the Trust by the plaintiffs.
1. The plaintiffs 1 to 3 are the appellants. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration that the first plaintiff is a Public Charitable Trust, for declaration that the supplementary and amended Deed of Trust, dated 26.05.2005 executed by the defendants 1 and 2 is illegal, null and void and not binding on the first appellant Trust, for declaration that the Trust Board Meeting held on 04.01.2006 removing the plaintiffs 2 to 4 from the office of the Secretary/Treasurer and as trustees and primary membership of the Board of Trust and appointing the 7th defendant as Secretary/Treasurer is illegal, null and void and not binding on the first appellant Trust and for consequential injunction.
2. The case of the plaintiffs/appellants is that the first plaintiff is a Public Charitable Trust and the Trust came into existence by the execution of a Deed of Trust by the respondents 1 and 2 on 24.08.1998. As per the Trust Deed, the first respondent is the Chairman and the 2nd respondent his wife is the Vice-Chairman and the 2nd plaintiff is the Secretary and the respondents 1 and 2 are permanent residents of Penanag, Malaysia and the Trust was under management of the 2nd appellant and due to illegal advise, the respondents 1 and 2, taking advantage of their position as founders of the Trust and under the guise of the clause 45 of the Trust Deed, executed a Supplementary Deed of Trust, dated 26.05.2005 arrogated to themselves, the power to cancel any resolution passed by the Trust Board and also amended the various clauses of the Trust Deed and by reason of the Supplementary Deed of Trust, the respondents 1 and 2 made several changes in the objects of the Trust and after the execution the illegal Supplementary Deed, the respondents 1 and 2 convened a meeting of the Trust Board on 04.01.2006 and in that meeting, resolutions were passed removing the appellants 2 to 4 from the office of the Secretary, Treasurer and Trustee and appointed the 7th respondent as Secretary of the Trust and the convening of the alleged meeting on 04.01.2006 was against the procedure contemplated under the Trust Deed dated 24.08.1998 and no such meeting was called for and it was only crated for the record and the alleged meeting has no legal force and therefore, the removal of the appellants 2 to 4 from the post of Secretary/Treasurer/Trustee are illegal and null and void and not binding on the first appellant Trust and therefore, prayed for consequential injunction.
3. The 7th respondent filed a written statement and the same was adopted by other respondents and the defence of the 7th respondent was that the suit filed without obtaining leave under section 92 of CPC is not maintainable and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. It is further stated that the suit filed on behalf of the Trust is also not maintainable as the 2nd appellant ceased to be the Secretary and Correspondent of the Trust and therefore, he cannot represent the Trust and on that ground, the suit is not maintainable. It is further contented that there was mismanagement in the affairs of the Trust by the 2nd appellant, taking advantage of the absence of the respondents 1 and 2 and even according to the original Trust Deed, dated 24.08.1998, the respondents 1 and 2 are the founders of the Trust and as per clause 45 of the Trust Deed, they have got powers to amend, add, alter, repeal any of the provisions of the Trust Deed and in exercise of that power and with a view to achieve the objects of the Trust, the respondents 1 and 2 thought it fit to execute the Supplementary Trust Deed and under the Supplementary Trust Deed, they have not changed the objects of the Trust and they have only changed certain procedural aspects as stated in the Trust Deed dated 24.08.1988 and the respondents 1 and 2 are competent to execute the Supplementary Trust Deed and that can not be questioned by the appellants and the meeting of the Trust Board was convened on 04.01.2006 and as per the Supplementary T
