2005 Supreme(SC) 766

2005(4) Supreme 387
Supreme Court of India
(From Gujarat High Court)
B.P. Singh & S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Church of North India —Appellant
versus
Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 9419 of 2003
With
I.A. Nos. 5 to 10 of 2005
(Application for impleading party)
Decided on 3-5-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : C.A. Sundaram, Sr. Advocate, Ms. Rohini, Sashank Kumar, Ms. Manjula Gupta, Advocates.
For the Respondents : K. Ramamoorthy, Sr. Advocate, Huzefa Ahmadi, M.I. Marchant, Ejaz Maqbool, Nakul Dewan, Ms. Solani Sinha, Abhimit Sinha, Vikash Singh, M.N. Shroff, Naveen Chawla, D.M. Nargolkar, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Advocates.­

Important point
The Bombay Public Trusts Act is a complete Code in itself and the matter regarding dissolution of a trust is a matter which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner and declaration cannot be granted by a Civil Court as regard succession of the District Church of Brethren as the same was a religious trust registered under the Act.

Headnote:Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950—Sections 2(10), 2(13), 13(b), 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 36, 50, 51, 74, 79 and 80—Societies Registration Act—Section 13—Extent of bar of juris­diction of Civil Court—Principles for ­determination—Resolution of Brethren Church affirmed that Church of North India would be deemed to be legal continuation and successor of Brethren Church—It was stated that rights, ­title, claims, estates and interest of this Church together with its privileges and obligations shall vest in CNI as its ­legal heir—Church ceased to exist as separate entity both as a society and as a trust—Local churches or congregations which desired to function on the basis of the old Constitution were at liberty to do so till 3rd Ordinary Syncod of CNI which was to be held in 1977—Most of the churches or congregations under the Gujarat Diocesan Council implemented it—Defendants who were said to be initially part of the CNI and were parties to the resolution raised a contention that Brethren Church ­continued to exist—They started ­obstructing the functioning of CNI and in particular the worship in churches and ­arrested that the First Brethren Church had not been dissolved and continued and they represented the same—Plaintiffs, former ­office bearers of the Brethren Church filed a civil suit—Brethren Church were not made parties in the said suit—Whether jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in terms of Section 80 of the BPT Act—(Yes).

       Held : The question as regard ouster of a jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be construed having regard to the Scheme of the Act as also the object and purport it seeks to achieve. The law in this regard is no longer res integra. A plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court must be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety. The Court may not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de’hors the factual averments made in the plaint. The rules of pleadings postulate that a plaint must contain material facts. When the plaint read as a whole does not disclose material facts giving rise to a cause of action which can be entertained by a civil court, it may be rejected in terms of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Paras 38 and 39)

       The BPT Act is a special law. It confers jurisdiction upon the Charity Commissioner and other authorities named therein. The statute has been enacted by the Parliament in public interest to safeguard the properties vested in the trusts as also control and management thereof so that the trust property may not be squandered or the object or purport for which a public trust is created may not be defeated by the persons having control thereover. A society may be created either for charitable or religious purposes as also for other purposes. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. It cannot own any property. The properties belonging to a society admittedly vest in the trustees. In terms of Section 2(13) of the BPT Act, a society is also a charitable trust. Both the Acts are regulatory in nature. The object and purport of both the Acts are clear and the provisions thereof do not contain any obscurity. It has not been argued before us, as was done before the learned Trial Judge, that there exists any inconsistency between the provisions of the Societies Registration Act which is a Parliamentary Act, on the one hand, and the BPT Act, which is a State Act, on the other. The core question which had been raised before us is as to whether the Society managing or governing the trust having a separate entity; in relation to its affairs the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. (Para 42)

       In this case, we are not concerned with a dispute as regard absolute title of the trust property. We are also not concerned with the question as regard creation of any right by the trust in a third party which would be otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. It is also not a case where the plaintiffs made a complaint that the provisions of the BPT Act were not complied with or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In fact no order has been passed on the Appellant’s application for changes in the entries made in the registers maintained under Section 17 of the Act. The BPT Act provides for express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It in various provisions contained in Chapter IV a power of inquiry and consequently a power of adjudication as regard the list of movable and immovable trust property, the description and particulars thereof for the purpose of its identification have been conferred. In fact, the trustee of a public trust is enjoined with a statutory duty to make an application for registration wherein all necessary descriptions of movable and immovable property belonging to the trust including their description and particulars for the purpose of identification are required to be furnished. Section 19 provides for an inquiry for registration with a view to ascertaining inter alia the mode of succession to the office­ of the trustee as also whether any property is the property of such trust. It is only when the statutory authority satisfies itself as regard the genuineness of the trust and the properties held by it, an entry is made in the registers and books, etc. maintained in terms of Section 17 of the Act in consonance with the provisions of Section 21 thereof. Such an entry, it will bear repetition to state, is final and conclusive. Changes can be brought about only in terms of Section 22 thereof. (Para 72)

       A change notice having been given, it would now be for the appropriate authority to consider the matter and if a change has occurred, a finding is required to be arrived which must contain the reasons therefor. The defendants are disputing that any such change in accordance with law was effected. An order passed by Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is appealable. Yet again, when an amendment is made in the entry in the register, the same would be final and conclusive. Even a power exists for holding a further inquiry. Section 31 bars a suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust. C.N.I. got itself registered as a public trust in the year 1981. A suit evidently was filed by the plaintiffs in the year 1980 because C.N.I. was not then entitled to file a suit. It may be true that the suit was filed under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure but therein the question as to whether the Appellant herein, being a registered trust became entitled to the properties of Brethren Church could not have been gone into. What is prohibited is to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust. When the plaintiffs intended to enforce a right on behalf of the Appellant, the suit was evidently not maintainable. (Paras 73 and 74)

       Furthermore, the purported resolutions of the churches affiliated to the Brethren Church and merger thereof with the Appellant, having regard to the provisions of the Act was required to be done in consonance with the provisions thereof. It is not necessary for us to consider as to whether such dissolution of the churches and merger thereof in the Appellant would amount to alienation of immovable property but we only intend to point out that even such alienation is prohibited in law. The control and management of the religious trusts vests in the Charity Commissioner. The trustees of the Trust are statutorily enjoined with a duty to render all cooperation to the Charity Commissioner. The directions issued by the Charity Commissioner to the trustees are binding. Dissolution of a trust, it is not disputed, is a matter which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. (Para 75)

       The provisions of the Act and the Scheme thereof leave no manner of doubt that the Act is a complete code in itself. It provides for a complete machinery for a person interested in the trust to put forward his claim before the Charity Commissioner who is competent to go into the question and to prefer appeal if he feels aggrieved by any decision. The bar of jurisdiction created under Section 80 of the Act clearly points out that a third party cannot maintain a suit so as to avoid the rigours of the provisions of the Act. The matter, however, would be different if the property is not a trust property in the eye of law. The civil court’s jurisdiction may not be barred as it gives rise to a jurisdictional question. If a property did not validly vest in a trust or if a trust itself is not valid in law, the authorities under the Act will have no jurisdiction to determine the said question. With a view to determine the question as regard exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the court has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the court comes to the conclusion that the question is required to be determined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court must be held to have been ousted. The questions which are required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated. Section 26 of the Act must be read in that context as it specifically refers to those questions wherewith a court of competent jurisdiction can deal with and if the same is not expressly or impliedly barred. Once a decision is arrived at, having regard to the nature of the claim as also the reliefs sought for, that civil court has no jurisdiction, Section 26 per force will have no application whatsoever. (Paras 84 and 85)

       The Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to a matter whereover the statutory authorities have the requisite jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a question arises, which is outside the purview of the Act or in relation to a matter, unconnected with the administration or possession of the trust property, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction. In this case, having regard to the nature of the lis, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was clearly barred. (Para 100)