The court emphasized the importance of providing necessary materials for the effective defense of the petitioner and highlighted the preventive nature of the steps taken under Section 107 Cr.P.C. and Section 111 Cr.P.C.

1. Challenging the summons issued by the Executive Magistrate u/s 107 r/w 111 Cr.P.C., the petitioner is before this Court.

2. The factual matrix of the case is as under:

2.1 V. Ganesan, the Inspector of Police, No.15 Velampalayam Police Station, Tiruppur, registered a case in Cr.No.441 of 2016 on 21.07.2016 u/s 107 Cr.P.C. and placed the same before the Executive Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner of Police, Tiruppur City, for initiating action u/s 107 r/w 111 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner herein, pursuant to which the Executive Magistrate issued the impugned summons as aforestated.

2.2 It is averred by the Executive Magistrate that, on 15.07.2016, a dispute arose in Mahalakshmi Nagar which falls within his territorial jurisdiction, between “A” party and “B” party with regard to conduct of prayers and as a fall out, there has been breach of peace in the area and there is likelihood of further breach of peace and tranquillity. Therefore, the petitioner has been called upon to appear on 11.08.2016 to show cause as to why he should not furnish a bond for Rs.10,000/- for a period of one year for his keeping good conduct.

3. Mr. G. Karthikeyan, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that an FIR cannot be registered under Section 107 Cr.P.C., as Section 107 Cr.P.C. is not a substantive penal provision nor is it a cognizable offence. He also submitted that the Executive Magistrate should have conducted a preliminary enquiry regarding the background of the issue and had he done so, he would have been aware of the orders passed by the First Bench of this Court in this regard and he would not have issued the impugned summons. The learned counsel also assailed the impugned summons and the order passed under Section 111 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the order is bereft of details and has given only general information, which is not enough for the petitioner. The learned counsel further submitted that there is a discrepancy in the order, inasmuch as it shows that the Executive Magistrate has signed the order on 08.08.2016, but the order bears the date 11.08.2016, which clearly shows that the Executive Magistrate has not applied his mind. To buttress his contention, he relied upon the following judgments:

1. Ayyavoo Chettair & Others v. Inspector of Police, Ennore & others

2. Kasapparai and others v. State rep. by Inspector of Police, Tiruvottiyur

3. Sandeep Shivaji Mhatre & others v. The State of Maharashtra through Ld. Public Prosecutor, (A.S.) & another

4. Ahammad Kabeer, Kollam vs. State of Kerala, rep by Sub Inspector of Police, Ernakulam & another.

4. It is true that Section 107 Cr.P.C. does not create substantive penal offence for the purpose of police investigation under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, a practice has come to stay in Tamil Nadu, whereby, the Station House Officer uses the FIR book for the purpose of sending a report to the Executive Magistrate for the purpose of initiating action u/s 107 Cr.P.C. An FIR book that is supplied by the Government will have printed serial numbers running in seriatim. The police are required to use the FIR book for preparation of the FIRs, and the crime numbers of the Station should be serially entered in the FIR book. These safeguards are provided in order to ensure that the police do not misuse the FIR book for making insertions midway. However, Police Stations have not been provided with any separate stationery for sending reports u/s 107 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the police use the FIR book and assign a crime number to the case, though it is technically a report of the Station House Officer given to the Executive Magistrate for him to take action u/s 107 Cr.P.C. In the absence of any prejudice to the petitioner, this methodology adopted by the police cannot be faulted and therefore, this contention stands rejected.

5. In support of the second contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the aforesaid judgments to show that the order u/s 111 C