SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M. HIDAYATULLAH C.J.I., J.M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA, G.K. MITTER, C.A. VAIDIALINGAM, A.N. RAY AND I.D. DUA, JJ.
Madhu Limaye (In W. P. No. 77 of 1970) Madhu Limaye and another (In W.P. No. 307 of 1970), Petitioners
Versus
Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and others (In W. P. No. 77 of 1970), Ved Murti and others (In W. P. No. 307 of 1970), Respondents. The Attorney General for India (In W. P. Nos. 77 and 307 of 1970) Union of India (In W.P. No. 307 of 1970) (By Notice) Sajiwan Lal, S. A. Dange, Raj Narain, R. K. Vohra, Rao Mukhtar Ali and others, K. N. Sharma and others, G. S. Negi and, R. K. Garg, Interveners.
Writ Petns. Nos. 77 and 307 of 1970, D/- 28-10-1970.
Advocates appeared
W. P. No. 77 of 1970. Mr. Madhu Limaye in person, M/s. Nuruddin Ahmed, K. P. Verma and D. Goburdhun, Advocates, (for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4); Mr. Niren De Attorney General for India (M/s. R. H. Dhebar, H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, Advocates, with him), for the Attorney General for India; W. P. No. 307 of 1970: Mr. Madhu Limaye in person; M/s. K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and Pratap Singh Advocates; for Petitioner No. 2: Mr. C. K. Daphtary and Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Sr. Advocates (Mr. O. P. Rana Advocate with them), for Respondents; Mr. Niren De, Attorney General for India (M/s. R. H. Dhebar, H. R. Khanna, S. P. Nayar and R. N. Sachthey, Advocates with him), for the Attorney General for India and Union of India; M/s. S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi and Co., for Nos. 1 to 3; Mr.A. S. R. Chari Sr. Advocate (M/s. S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi and Co. with him), for Nos. 4 and 7 M/s. S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi and Co. and Mr. Asif Ansari Advocate for No. 5; Mr. Shiva Pujan Singh Advocate, for No. 6 and Mr, D. P. Singh, Advocate, for No. 8, for Interveners.
-see decision in Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M. Monghyr, AIR 1971 SC 2486=(1971) 2 SCJ479; Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896=1958 SCJ 88; State of Maharashtra v. H.N. Rao, AIR 1970 SC 1157=(1969) 2 SCR 392=(1970) I SCJ 685.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:
The constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, specifically Section 144 and Chapter VIII, was challenged, but the Court concluded that these provisions are within the constitutional limits for restricting fundamental freedoms (!) (!) .
The rights guaranteed under the fundamental freedoms—speech, assembly, association, and movement—are not absolute; they are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order and the sovereignty and integrity of India (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The scope of "public order" is interpreted as encompassing acts that disturb public peace, safety, and tranquility, but it does not extend to mere disturbances that do not threaten public order or security (!) (!) .
Restrictions imposed under laws like Section 144 and Chapter VIII are justified if they are reasonable and necessary to prevent grave disturbances, maintain public safety, and uphold public tranquility (!) (!) .
The procedural safeguards built into these provisions, such as requiring reasons to be recorded in writing, opportunity for the affected person to be heard, and judicial review, ensure that restrictions are not arbitrary or unjustified (!) (!) (!) .
The distinction between detention under preventive laws and executive action under constitutional provisions is recognized; the former involves judicial safeguards and is aimed at preventing breaches of peace, not punitive detention (!) (!) .
The power conferred on magistrates under these provisions is considered reasonable and in accordance with the constitutional mandate, with the scope for abuse being mitigated by procedural safeguards and judicial oversight (!) (!) (!) .
The Court emphasizes that existing laws are presumed valid until declared otherwise, and the burden of proof lies on those challenging their constitutionality (!) (!) .
The concept of "public order" is interpreted broadly but with a clear distinction from mere disturbances of public tranquility; it requires a serious threat to public safety or security (!) (!) .
The provisions aim to prevent offences and disturbances of public peace through preventive measures, and their application must be within reasonable limits to avoid infringing on fundamental freedoms (!) (!) .
Overall, the Court affirms that the statutory provisions, when properly understood and applied, are constitutionally valid and do not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (!) .
Please let me know if you need a more detailed analysis or specific legal advice based on these points.
Judgment
HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.I. (for himself, and on behalf of SHELAT, MITTER, VAIDIALINGAM, RAY AND DUA JJ.): During the hearing of these petitions the constitutional validity of Section 144 and Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure was challenged and this Special Bench was nominated to consider the issue. Lengthy arguments were addressed to us by the petitioner and several interveners. The matter, as we shall show later, lies in a narrow compass. At the end of the arguments we announced our conclusion that the said provisions of the Code, properly understood, were not in excess of the limits laid down in the Constitution, for restricting the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d). We reserved our reasons and now we proceed to give them.
2. We are required to test the impugned provisions against the first four sub-clauses of the first clause of the nineteenth article. We may accordingly begin by reading the subclauses:
19. (1) All citizens shall have the right-
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions; and
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
These sub-clauses deal with four distinct but loosely related topics. They preserve certain personal as well as group freedoms. They allow an individual freedom of speech and movement and as a member of a group (and for the group also) the same freedoms plus the right of assembly and formation of associations and unions. Although the guarantees appear to be in absolute terms, in reality they are not so. A number of restrictive exceptions are engrafted upon each of the freedom previously guaranteed. The restrictions are contained in cls. (2), (3), (4) and (5) and are related respectively to sub-cls (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the first clause. Clause (5) covers sub-cls. (e) and (f) of the first clause also, but the additional fact does not concern us. Of these, cl. (2), as it stands today, was not originally in the Constitution but was substituted with retrospective effect by S. 3 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951. Strictly speaking there never was any clause (2) other than the one we have before us today unless we were to hold that the first amendment was either not valid or not retrospective. We were invited to do so and to reconsider the decision in L. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 but we declined because its validity was not doubted at any stage in that case. The validity of the. Amendment therefore cannot now be questioned.
3. As a result we are not required to read the former cl. (2) which never existed. Clauses (2), (3) and (4) were further amended by the insertion of the words "The sovereignty and integrity of India" in each of them, by S. 2 of the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act 1963. The clauses as they exist today read:
"(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State 2491 from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it impose, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the r
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