The main legal point established in the judgment is the arbitrability of the dispute and the survival of the arbitration clause even if the main agreement is declared null and void.

This is an application filed in terms of Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (in short 'Act'), praying for the appointment of an arbitrator to settle disputes that have arisen inter se the parties. The petitioner is a public charitable trust established by Smt Sushila and Sri R. Ramaswami for extending medical relief, support for education, relief for the poor and other charitable activities.

2. The Trust was a legatee under the will of Sri. Ramaswami, receiving a property belonging to him located on Chamiers Road, Chennai to further the philantrophic intentions of the couple.

3. The Trust thereafter entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (in short MOA) dated 12.7.2013 with the respondent for sale of the property to augment its income. The MOA sets out the detailed terms and conditions that govern the proposed transaction of sale and purchase and includes inter alia clause 6.6 that provides for the resolution of disputes or differences that may arise inter se the parties, by arbitration. The clause reads thus:

'6.6. Any dispute or differences which may arise between the parties either as to the construction, meaning or effect of any o the clauses of these presents or as to any at, mater or thing or obligations of the parties hereto shall be referred to the arbitration of sole arbitrator who shall be appointed by mutual consent of both the parties and whose decision shall be final and binding on both the parties. The provisions of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply to such proceedings and the seat of arbitration shall be at Chennai.'

4. According to the petitioner, there were delays on the part of the respondent to fulfil their obligations under the MOA leading to an exchange of communication between the parties in this regard. Initially the respondent was conciliatory in approach, requesting for time to fulfil is obligations and complete the sale. However, letter dated 11.6.2016 indicated otherwise with the respondent making various allegations against, and raising demands of the petitioner.

5. Vide letter dated 18.6.2016, the petitioner called upon the respondent to complete the transaction setting a dead line of 30.6.2016 or latest 15.7.2016 as sought for by the respondent in e-mail dated 4.4.2016. The trust also communicated that in the alternative, the MOA would be treated as cancelled. In reply dated 22.7.16, no clear commitment was expressed by the respondent.

6. The trust thereafter cancelled the MOA on 23.7.2016 returning the advance of Rs. 1 lakh received by it under the MOA. This was, however, not accepted by the respondent, who, under cover of letter dated 1.8.2016 returned the cheque expressing their non-acceptance of the cancellation of the MOA.

7. Simultaneously, the respondent also approached the City Civil Court in O.S.No.4052 of 2016 seeking to declare the termination of the MOA as illegal I.A.No.10046 of 2016 was filed seeking to restrain the trust from entering into any transaction with regard to the property at Chamiers road with a third party. Inter alia, the petitioner has filed a petition u/s 8 of the Act seeking reference of the matter to an Arbitrator for resolution.

8. In the background of these facts, Mr. M.S. Krishnan, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. S. Sivasankar, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that a dispute has clearly arisen between the parties that is liable to be referred to arbitration as agreed to under the MOA.

9. Mr. Karthick, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. S. Ravichandran, learned counsel for the respondent would object to the maintainability of this petition on three grounds. Firstly, that the Civil Court was already seized of the matter, secondly, that the unilateral dissolution of the MOA by the petitioner nullifies the arbitration clause and thirdly, that a right in rem or prayer for specific performance is not liable to be decided in proceedings for arbitration. He would point out that the relief of decl