The respondents in the civil revision petition have filed this review application seeking to review the order dated 27.03.2017 passed in C.R.P. (NPD) No.465 of 2006.

2. The review petitioners are the tenants and the respondents are the landlords. In the civil revision petition, it was alleged by the landlords that the first review petitioner herein is a chronic defaulter and that the first review petitioner has sublet the property to the second review petitioner, without obtaining written consent from the respondents herein, and despite several reminders, rent and arrears were not paid. The landlords also pleaded that the petition premises is required for own use and occupation.

3. This Court, by order dated 27.3.2017, allowed the civil revision petition holding that the landlords are entitled to eviction on the ground of own use and occupation. The tenants were granted three months time to vacate the petition premises.

4. The learned counsel for the tenants submits that the even though the Appellate Authority held that there is no proof as to carrying on of business of the landlords, the High Court erroneously concluded that the landlords are carrying on business in the petition premises, without any evidence. It is added that the landlords own five other non residential buildings in the city of Chennai.

5. He further submitted that no steps have been taken for starting the business and hence, the claim of the landlords is not bona fide as per Section 10(3)(a)(3) of the Rent Control Act. He also pleaded that this Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, exercising the revisional powers, cannot invoke its revisional jurisdiction under the cloak of an appeal in disguise and in any event, this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in the place of conclusion of appellate authority.

6. To support his case the learned counsel for the petitioner has produced two judgments in the case of

(i) S.S. Khader Mohammed Rowther and Co. v. G.S. Sundaram and Brothers reported in 1978 (1) MLJ 79, it is stated as follows:

“19. The Supreme Court took the same view in two later decisions. Ferozilal v. Manmal, AIR 1970 SC 794 and Kaushalya v. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838, Hedge J. speaking for the court in the latter case observed thus (at P.796).

“From the facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no stage, the court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so, there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity”.

20. It might have been noticed that Hedge J. in the above said decision had not said that all orders of eviction passed in terms of compromises arrived at between the parties, must be regarded as nullities. There might be cases where either within the four corners of the memorandum of compromise or elsewhere from the record it might be possible to deduce the existence of the statutory grounds for eviction. Hedge J. does not seem to have regarded as invalid orders passed by the tribunals on the basis of compromise terms in such cases. Yet a general impression appears to have gained ground among lawyers that orders of eviction passed by a Tribunal on the basis of agreement between the parties must be held to be invalid on the score that the very presence of an agreement between the parties, must per se rule out the existence of satisfaction which the statute requires the Tribunal to form as pre-condition for eviction.

26. I do not agree with Mr. Kesava Iyengar's understanding of the ruling in the ab