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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
D.G. PALEKAR, V.R. KRISHNA IYER AND R.S. SARKARIA, JJ.
Nagindas Ramdas, Appellant
Versus
Dalpatram locharam alias Brijram and others : Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1479 (N) of 1972, D/- 30-11-1973.
Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 - Section 13 (1) (j), 12 (3), 12 and 13, 912, 10 (3) (a) (i) and 12 (3)(a) - Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act, 1952 – Section 13 - Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 – Section 10 - Rent Restrictions Act, 1920 - Evidence Act - Section 58 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order 23, Rule 3 - Tenant - Arrears of Rent - Terminating Tenancy - Possession of Premises - Whether or not a decree or order of eviction can be pased by Rent Court/Tribunal exercising special jurisdiction under any of these statutes - Whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions - Whether terms of compromise are consistent with provisions of Rent Act - Whether in a particular case consent decree for possession passed by Court under Bombay Rent Act is or is not a nullity - Whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for trial court s jurisdiction to pass decree it did - Whether there was material on basis of which Rent Court – Held, Court do not find any force in contention of Mr. Dholakia, that facts admitted in compromise, itself were insufficient to make out even a prima facie ground for eviction mentioned in Section 12 (3)(a) of Bombay Rent Act merely because tenant had made an application for fixation of standard rent, which was still pending at time of passing of decree - By admitting to pay arrears of rent and mesne profits at rate of Rs.15/- per month tenant had clearly withdrawn or abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent - As it may in cases where an objection as to non-executability of decree on ground of its being a nullity is taken Executing Court is not competent to go behind decree if decree on face of it discloses some material on basis of which Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to existence of a statutory ground for eviction - In such a case it must accept and execute decree as it stands - If on face of it, decree does not show existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, executing Court may look to original record of trial court - There was material on basis of which Rent Court could have as distinguished from must have been satisfied as to statutory ground for eviction - To allow Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to status of a super Court sitting in appeal over decision of Rent Court - Since in instant case there was a clear admission in compromise, incorporated in decree of fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under S.12 (3) (a) Executing Court was not competent to go behind decree and question its validity - Appeal dismissed
An admission in a legal context refers to a statement or declaration made by a party that admits the existence of a fact or facts relevant to the case. Such admissions can be either judicial or extrajudicial. Judicial admissions are made within the course of judicial proceedings and are binding on the party making them, serving as conclusive proof of the admitted facts. Extrajudicial admissions are made outside of court proceedings and can be used as evidence to establish certain facts, although they may be subject to challenge or explanation.
In the specific context of the provided document, an admission—particularly in a compromise or settlement—can be a clear and binding acknowledgment of material facts that constitute grounds for legal action, such as eviction. When an admission is incorporated into a decree or agreement, it is considered to be a strong proof of the admitted facts and can significantly influence the court’s decision, especially if it relates to statutory grounds for eviction or other legal remedies.
Furthermore, an admission made in a compromise agreement, if clear and unambiguous, can be regarded as an admission of the material facts necessary for establishing a legal claim or defense. Such admissions, when accepted by the court, can be relied upon to uphold or invalidate legal proceedings, provided they are consistent with the relevant statutory provisions and procedural requirements.
In summary, an admission is a statement that recognizes the truth of a fact or facts pertinent to a legal matter, and when made explicitly or implicitly in a legally binding document, it can serve as a decisive element in establishing the facts necessary for the court’s jurisdiction or for proving a particular claim.
Judgment
SARKARIA, J. :- Whether the decree dated September 23, 1964, passed by the Trial Judge in Regular Suit No.6 of 1963, filed under the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 (for short, called Bombay Rent Act) directing the eviction of the appellant is a nullity an as such inexecutable, is the only question that falls for decision in this appeal by special leave. It arises out of these facts :
Appellant was a tenant of the premises at Ward No.3 Nondh. No. 1823/9 in the Salabatpur area of Surat. He was in arrears of rent since 16-10-1961. On 16-11-1962 the landlords respondents herein) served a notice on the appellant terminating his tenancy and also requiring him to pay the arrears of rent. On 2-1-1964 the landlords instituted the suit in the Court at Surat for possession against the tenant on two grounds namely.
(i) non-payment of rent in arrears for a period of more than one year.
(ii) bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for their own use and occupation.
2. The rate of contractual rent was Rs.15/- per month. On 23-9-1964 the parties arrived at a compromise the terms of which as incorporated in the decree were as under :
(i) The defendant do hand over possession of the suit premises by 30-9-1968 without any objection. The tenant to pay Rs.532.50 P as arrears of rent and mesne profits up to 30-9-1964. The plaintiff is to receive Rupees 380/- deposited by the defendant in court and the remaining amount is to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs on or about 31-12-1964. The defendant is to pay Rs.15/- p.m. as mesne profits from 1-10-1964.
(ii) The relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties has come to an end and no such relationship is to be created by the compromise. The defendant has been given time to vacate the suit premises by way of grace if the defendant fails to comply with the aforesaid terms of the decree the plaitiffs would be entitled to execute the decree both for the decretal amount as well as for possession of the suit premises.
(iii) If the plaintiffs get for the defendant the lease of the premises bearing Nondh No.1602 of Ward No.3 on a monthly rent of Rs.50/- the defendant is to hand over the possession of the suit premises immediately.
(iv) The parties are to bear their own costs".
3. On 12-1-1968, the landlords filed a petition for execution of the decree. It was dismissed as premature. The tenant having failed to pay Rupees 152/50 i.e. the balance of arrears by the agreed date the decree-holder on 17-1-1968 again took out execution for the recovery of the said amount. Thereafter on 3-10-1968 the landlords filed the second petition to recover possession of the suit premises in execution of the decree.
4. The tenant admitted that he had according to the compromise, agreed to give possession on 30-9-1968 but added that in 1968 A.D. the ground floor of the premises had become submerged in flood waters and thereupon the decree-holders seeing his (tenant s) plight orally agreed to allow him to continue in the premises on payment of a monthly rent of Rs.15/- and thus the decree had been adjusted and satisfied. Subsequently by another application the judgment debtor raised an objection that since the decree had been passed by the Court without satisfying itself as to the existence of a ground of eviction under the Bombay Rent Act, it was a nullity and as such not executable.
5. The executing court (Joint Civil Judge Surat) rejected the story of adjustment and satisfaction of the decree but accepted the other objection holding that the decree was void because "the Court did not apply its mind while allowing it under Sec. 13 (1) (j) Rent Act, With regard to the second ground it was said that it had ceased to exist because "under the terms of compromise the default in payment of rent was waived and the defendant was given time to pay up to 30-9-1968". In the resutl, the execution was dismissed.
6. From the order of the executing court the decree-holders carried an appeal to the Extra Assistant
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