2018 Supreme(Mad) 2941
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
T. Ravindran, J.
Arulmigu Vaikunda Perumal Koil - Appellant
Vs.
S. Geetha - Respondent
Second Appeal No. 73 of 2015
Decided On : 10-10-2018
Advocate Appeared:
Arul Phazam Nee, R. Singaravelan, A. Kandasamy
The central legal point established in the judgment is that the determination of title to inam land under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act should be adjudicated by the authorities or the tribunal constituted under the Act, and civil courts do not have jurisdiction to decide such claims.
Headnote:
Inam Title Deed - Suit Property - Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act 26/63 and 30/63 - The court discussed the plaintiff temple's claim of title to the suit property under the Inam Title Deed No. 1042 and the defendant's challenge to this claim based on the purchase of the property from her vendors. The court highlighted the application of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act to the suit property, the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim of patta, and the sub-judice nature of the matter before the authorities constituted under the Act. The court emphasized that the determination of title to the inam land should be adjudicated by the authorities or the tribunal constituted under the Act, and therefore, the plaintiff's suit for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction was premature.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff temple claimed ownership of the suit property under the Inam Title Deed No. 1042, while the defendant asserted her right to the property based on a registered sale deed from her vendors. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court reversed the judgment and dismissed the suit, leading to the second appeal.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaintiff's claim of title to the suit property was premature as the matter was sub-judice before the authorities constituted under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act. The first appellate court's decision to dismiss the suit was upheld, and the second appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Issues: The issues revolved around the conflicting claims of title to the suit property by the plaintiff temple and the defendant, the application of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act, and the premature nature of the plaintiff's suit for injunction.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the determination of title to the inam land should be adjudicated by the authorities or the tribunal constituted under the Act, and therefore, the plaintiff's suit for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction was premature.
Final Decision: The second appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the first appellate court to dismiss the suit was upheld.
T. Ravindran, J.
In this second appeal, challenge is made to the judgment and decree dated 24.11.2010 passed in A.S.No.12 of 2005 on the file of Subordinate Court, Kancheepuram, reversing the judgment and decree dated 28.12.2004 passed in O.S. No.439 of 1998 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Kancheepuram.
2. Parties are referred to as per their rankings in the trial Court.
3. Suit for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction.
4. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that the suit property belongs to the plaintiff temple and covered under the Inam title deed No.1042 and the plaintiff temple filed a revision petition before the settlement officer against the order passed by the assistant settlement officer and the said revision petition was dismissed by order dated 21.12.1979 and as against the said order, the plaintiff temple filed a revision petition before the special commissioner and the commissioner of land administration, Chepauk, Madras by order dated 08.04.1986 and the commissioner was pleased to set aside the order of the settlement officer, Tanjavore with respect to survey number 847/68 and other survey numbers and against the order passed by the special commissioner, the plaintiff temple filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madras in W.P. No.13642/86 and the same was allowed by the High Court by order dated 21.02.1997 and the matter was remitted back to the settlement authorities for fresh disposal and the matter is sub-judice and the defendant has no legal right, whatsoever, over the suit property and she claims to be the successor in interest of one Pattammal who was a party to the settlement proceedings and as the matter is still subjudice, the defendant's vendor had no title to convey the property to the defendant and the plaintiff temple is the ablosute owner of the suit property and the same is in the possession and enjoyment and while so, the defendant all of a sudden started to put up some building in the suit property without any authority and despite the issuance of the legal notice by the plaintiff temple dated 27.06.1998, inasmuch as the defendant has proceeded with the construction, according to the plaintiff, it has been necessiated to lay the suit.
5. The case of the defendant, in brief, is that, after denying the allegations contained in the plaint, contended that she has purchased the suit property from one Murugan Vagayara by way of the sale deed dated 15.02.1996 for a valid consideration and the suit property is the ancestral property of the defendant's vendors obtained by way of the registered partition deed dated 07.06.1972 and in this connection O.S.No.29/1985 was preferred between the sons of D.K.T. Arasu Mudaliar, who is the father of the defendant's vendors and the suit ended in compromise and thus the defendant's vendors have perfected the title, right and interest over the suit property and conveyed the same to the defendant and thereafter the defendant had put up a temporary structure in the suit property and living in the same and now after removing the old structure, she had applied for the construction of a new house from the Kanchipuram Municipality and after getting the approved plan, put up a new construction and if really the plaintiff temple had any right over the suit property, the plaintiff would have objected the same. The defendant has put put up the temporary construction in the year 1996 itself and the suit property is a piece of land of the Rice mill building and the dry yard kalam is still in the possession and enjoyment of the defendant's vendors and there are other buildings also constructed and the defendant is the bonafide purchaser and invested a huge amount in the development of the property. The plaintiff should have impleaded the vendors of the defendant as the necessary parties and the description of the suit property is incorrect and the plaintiff's petition before the settlement officer had been rejected and the plaintiff's clai