2018 Supreme(Mad) 3243
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
V.K. TAHILRAMANI, M. DURAISWAMY, JJ.
COMMISSIONER OF GST AND CENTRAL EXCISE - Appellant
Versus
GANDHIMATHI - Respondent
W.P. No. 28103 of 2018
Decided on : 26-10-2018
Advocate Appeared:
A.P. Srinivas, Adv., J. Kumaran, Adv.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the principle of exhaustion of remedies before approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when there is an alternative statutory remedy available.
Headnote:
Writ Petition - Quashing of Sale Certificate - SARFAESI Act, 2002, Section 13(4), Section 14, Section 17(1), Section 18 - The court discussed the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, emphasizing the availability of alternative statutory remedies and the principle of exhaustion of remedies before approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court cited several Supreme Court decisions to support the view that when there is an alternative remedy available, a writ petition is not maintainable and should not be entertained.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought to quash a Sale Certificate mentioning the wrong Survey Number. The respondents argued that the writ petition should not be entertained as there is an alternative remedy of approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
Finding of the Court:
The court dismissed the writ petition, emphasizing that when there is an alternative remedy available, a writ petition is not maintainable and should not be entertained.
Issues: Quashing of Sale Certificate, Alternative Remedy, Maintainability of Writ Petition
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the principle of exhaustion of remedies before approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and cited several Supreme Court decisions to support the view that when there is an alternative remedy available, a writ petition is not maintainable and should not be entertained.
Final Decision: The writ petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was given the option to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
V K TAHILRAMANI, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Pleader (Puducherry) for the respondents 4 and 5.
2. The prayer of the petitioner is that the Sale Certificate dated 16.10.2017, in which the Survey Number of the petitioner is mentioned, be quashed.
3. According to the petitioner, the Survey Number mentioned in the Sale Certificate is wrongly shown as the Survey Number of the petitioner.
4. In reply to the query that there is an alternative remedy of approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the writ petition should not be entertained, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on two decisions of this Court to contend that even if there is an alternative remedy of approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the writ petition can be entertained. To support his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on paragraph 35 of the decision of this Court in the case of Sheeba Philominal Merlin and another v. The Repatriates Co-op Finance & Development Bank Ltd. (Government of India Enterprise) No.33, North Usman Road, T.Nagar, Chennai-17 and Others), reported in 2010 (5) CTC 449. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on paragraph 21 of the decision of this Court in N.R.Sadasivam v. Indian Bank, (2013) 1 CTC 53, Adyar Branch, 91, 1st Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Chennai and Others, reported in .
5. However, the Supreme Court in the decision in Agarwal Tracom Private Limited v. Punjab National Bank and Others, reported in, (2018) 1 SCC 626 held as follows:
"32. In United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others., (2010) 8 SCC 110, this Court had the occasion to examine in detail the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the question regarding invocation of the extraordinary power under Article 226/227 in challenging the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act. Their Lordships gave a note of caution while dealing with the writ filed to challenge the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act and made following pertinent observations which, in our view, squarely apply to the case on hand:
42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression any person used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.
43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.
44. While expressing the aforesai