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2019 Supreme(Mad) 481

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
M. SUNDAR, J.
Tiruchirapalli District Football Association, Rep. by its Honorary Secretary - Appellant
Versus
Tamil Nadu Football Association, Rep. by its President - Respondent
O.P. No. 663 of 2016
Decided on : 30-04-2019

Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:J. Sivanandaraaj, S. Mahesh Kumar, Advocates.
For the Respondent:P.V. Balasubramaniam, Advocate.

The main legal point established in the judgment is that the contravention of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is a ground for setting aside an arbitral award, and the construction of terms of contract by the Arbitral Tribunal must be in line with the terms of the contract.

Headnote:

Arbitration and Conciliation Act - Challenge to Impugned Arbitral Award - Articles 9 and 16 of Bylaws - Conflict with Public Policy of India, Patent Illegality - Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Section 34(2A)

Fact of the Case:

The case involved a challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The dispute arose between the Tiruchirapalli District Football Association (Trichy DFA) and the Tamil Nadu Football Association (TNFA) regarding the supercession of Trichy DFA by TNFA.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the impugned arbitral award was vitiated by patent illegality and in conflict with public policy of India. The court held that the award contravened Section 28(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and was contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law.

Issues: The pivotal issue before the court was the supercession of Trichy DFA by TNFA, and whether the arbitral award was in conflict with public policy and vitiated by patent illegality.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of Articles 9 and 16 of the bylaws, which were found to be terms of contract within the meaning of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The court held that the award's conclusion was contrary to the construction placed on the terms of the contract by the Arbitral Tribunal, leading to the invalidation of the award.

Final Decision: The court allowed the Original Petition, set aside the impugned arbitral award, and answered the petitioner's prayer before the Arbitral Tribunal in the affirmative.

JUDGMENT :

(Prayer : Original Petition filed under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act 26 of 1996) to set aside the award dated 23.07.2016 passed by the learned Arbitrator.)

1. Instant 'Original Petition' (hereinafter 'OP' for brevity) has been presented in this Court on 29.08.2016 under Section 34 of 'The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996' ('A & C Act' for brevity) assailing an arbitral award dated 23.07.2016 (hereinafter 'impugned arbitral award' for brevity) made by an 'AT' ('AT' for brevity) constituted by a sole arbitrator, who is former Hon'ble Judge of this Court.

2. Before the AT there was a sole claimant and a lone respondent. Sole claimant's plea was dismissed with costs by the AT vide impugned arbitral award. Sole claimant is the sole petitioner before me in the instant OP and obviously the lone respondent before AT is the only respondent in the instant OP before me also.

3. Though the caption to the petition in the instant OP reads that it has been filed under Section 34 of A&C Act, learned counsel for petitioner before me, in the hearing made it clear that instant OP is predicated on two specific grounds under Section 34, namely conflict with public policy of India and patent illegality, i.e., Section 34(2)(b)(ii) read with Clause (ii) and (iii) of Explanation 1 and Section 34(2A). In other words, instant OP is predicted on the grounds that the impugned arbitral award is in conflict with public policy of India, that it is vitiated by patent illegality on the face of the impugned arbitral award and is therefore liable to be set aside on these two grounds.

4. To be noted, in the instant case, an application prior to commencement of arbitral proceedings under section 9 of A & C Act was filed being O.A.No.1252 of 2015 on 08.12.2015. Ultimately, the sole arbitrator who constituted AT was appointed in these proceedings. Impugned award came to be passed on 23.7.2016 and the instant O.P had been presented in this Court on 29.8.2016.

5. Therefore, the date of commencement of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of section 21 of A & C Act is not available in the instant case. However, as sole arbitrator was appointed by consent in aforesaid O.A.No.1252 of 2015, admittedly before commencement of arbitral proceedings and as this application was filed on 08.12.2015, it can be safely inferred that arbitral proceedings in the impugned award are post 23.10.2015 and therefore, instant O.P will be tested as one under section 34 of A & C Act as it exists in the statute book post amendment on and with effect from 23.10.2015 brought in initially by an Ordinance and subsequently by amending Act No.3 of 2016.

6. Before I proceed further, it is necessary to set out the factual matrix of this case in a nutshell. To be noted, instant OP being one under Section 34 of A & C Act, it is neither an appeal nor a revision. It is not even a full fledged review. It is only a challenge to impugned arbitral award on the limited and specific grounds adumbrated under Section 34 of A & C Act. Therefore, factual matrix will be in a nutshell, it will contain only bare minimum facts that are imperative for understanding / appreciating this order. To put in differently it will be a thumbnail sketch of facts and the narrative will include the trajectory of the proceedings before AT.

7. FACTUAL MATRIX AND TRAJECTORY OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE AT:

7(i) It unfurls from the submissions made before me that there is no specific statute dealing with conduct of various sports in the country. It is submitted that there is a National Sports Code governing National Sports Federations.

7(ii) The instant case pertains to one particular sport, namely the game of Football.

7(iii) 'All India Football Federation' ('AIFF' for brevity), this Court is informed is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Central Act). This Court is further informed that respondent before this Court, namely 'Tamil Nadu Football Association' ('TNFA' for brevit
















































































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