The main legal point established is that the absence of established Circuit Benches of the NCLAT, as directed by the Supreme Court, does not automatically grant the right to file a writ petition before the High Court, and the appropriate remedy is to file an appeal before the NCLAT.

(Prayer: Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the constitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records relating to National Company Law Tribunal impugned order dated 08.04.2019 in C.P./1314/(IB)/2018 and quash the same.)

1. The matter is listed today before this Court under the caption “for maintainability”.

2. The writ petition was filed challenging the order of the National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai (Bench) dated 08.04.2019 in admitting a petition filed by the first respondent herein, the Financial Creditor under Section 7 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016, against the petitioner herein, the Corporate Debtor/Guarantor for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.

3. The Registry raised a query as to how the Writ Petition is maintainable, when there is an appeal remedy available before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal and thus, returned the papers.

4. The papers were represented by the learned counsel for the petitioner explaining that the remedy of appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal is inefficacious and ineffective and that there is a grave threat of paper publication by the 2nd respondent.

5. With the above explanation submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the papers are placed before this Court to decide the maintainability issue.

6. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that though a statutory appellate remedy is available against the impugned order before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi, still, the writ petition is maintainable, in view of the recent decision made by the Honourable Supreme Court dated 25.01.2019 in the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others (2019 SCC OnLine SC 73)

7. Learned senior counsel invited this Court's attention to paragraph Nos. 24 and 25 of the said decision and submitted that as on date, the Circuit Benches of the NCLAT have not been established by the Central Government as directed the Apex Court and therefore, the present Writ Petition can be entertained by this Court.

8. I have given my careful consideration to the above submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and also the observations and directions issued by the Honourable Apex Court at paragraph Nos.24 and 25 of the above decision.

9. Paragraph Nos. 24 and 25 of the above decision read as follows:

24. It has been argued by Shri Rohatgi that as per our judgment in Madras Bar Association (II) (supra), paragraph 123 states as follows:

"123. We shall first examine the validity of Section 5 of the NTT Act. The basis of challenge to the above provision has already been narrated by us while dealing with the submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioners with reference to the fourth contention.

According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, Section 5(2) of the NTT Act mandates that NTT would ordinarily have its sittings in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. According to the Petitioners, the aforesaid mandate would deprive the litigating Assessee the convenience of approaching the jurisdictional High Court in the State to which he belongs. An Assessee may belong to a distant/remote State, in which eventuality, he would not merely have to suffer the hardship of travelling a long distance, but such travel would also entail uncalled for financial expense. Likewise, a litigant Assessee from a far-flung State may find it extremely difficult and inconvenient to identify an Advocate who would represent him before NTT, since the same is mandated to be ordinarily located in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Even though we have expressed the view, that it is open to Parliament to substitute the appellate jurisdiction vested in the jurisdictional High Courts and constitute courts/tribunals to exercise the said jurisdiction, we are of the view, that while vesting jurisdiction in an alternative court/tribunal, it i