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2019 Supreme(Mad) 2364

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
SENTHILKUMAR RAMAMOORTHY, J.
The Superintending Engineer (Highways), Madurai & Others - Petitioners
Versus
S. Jayamani & Another - Respondents
O.P. No. 293 of 2011
Decided On : 04-10-2019

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioners: M. Sricharan Rangarajan, Spl. Government Pleader (CS)
For the Respondents:K.J. Parthasarathy, Advocate

The main legal point established in the judgment is that the construction of the contract and appraisal of evidence is within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal, and the decision in these respects would not be interfered with except on limited grounds.

Headnote:

Arbitration - Limitation - Jurisdiction - [Arbitration] - [Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34] - [Arbitration Act, Limitation Act, Contract Act] - The court discussed the limitation and jurisdictional challenges raised by the Petitioners in challenging the Arbitral Award. The court examined the relevant legal provisions and case laws to determine the validity of the challenges and concluded that the Award is not liable to be set aside.

Fact of the Case:

The First Respondent initiated Arbitration Proceedings claiming a sum of Rs.1,65,30,698/- with interest. The Preliminary Award held the First Respondent entitled to Rs.51,90,602/- with interest, and the Final Award directed the Petitioners to pay Rs.1,12,63,051.02 with interest, Arbitrator's fees, lawyer's fees, etc. The Petitioners challenged the Award primarily on the grounds of limitation and jurisdiction.

Finding of the Court:

The court rejected the contention that the Section 11 Petition was filed beyond the limitation period, as it was filed within three years from the date of payment of the final bill. The court also found that the claim was made within one year from the date of final payment, and the clause specifying time limitation was void under the Contract Act. Additionally, the court concluded that the Government Order imposing a pecuniary limit was not incorporated by reference in the contract between the parties.

Issues: The issues involved the validity of the challenges raised by the Petitioners regarding limitation and jurisdiction in the Arbitration Proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the Section 11 Petition was not time-barred, the clause specifying time limitation was void under the Contract Act, and the Government Order imposing a pecuniary limit was not incorporated by reference in the contract between the parties.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the Petition to set aside the Award, rejecting all objections and concluding that the Award is not liable to be set aside.

JUDGMENT :

(Prayer:- Original Petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside the Preliminary Award dated 03.06.2010 and Final Award dated 08.04.2011 passed by the Sole Arbitrator.)

1. The Respondents in the Arbitration Proceedings are the Petitioners before this Court. The First Respondent herein initiated Arbitration Proceedings wherein a sum of Rs.1,65,30,698/- with interest at 18% per annum on Rs.52,76,662/- was claimed. By Preliminary Award dated 03.06.2010, the learned Arbitrator held that the First Respondent herein is entitled to an aggregate sum of Rs.51,90,602/- with interest thereon. By Final Award dated 08.04.2011, the learned Arbitrator directed the Petitioners herein to pay a sum of Rs.1,12,63,051.02 with interest on the principal sum of Rs.51,90,602/- at 18% per annum from 22.11.2010 till the date of payment; Arbitrator's fees; lawyer's fees, expenses etc., as specified in the said Final Award. The said Awards are impugned herein and are referred to as the Award hereafter.

2. I heard the learned counsel for the Petitioners and the learned counsel for the First Respondent.

3. The learned counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Award is challenged primarily on the ground of limitation and jurisdiction. He subsequently circulated written submissions wherein some contentions were made on the merits also. With regard to limitation, he submitted that the admitted position is that the Arbitration Proceedings commenced on or about 21.04.1999, when the First Respondent herein invoked the arbitration clause. After invoking the arbitration clause on 21.04.1999, he submitted that the Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996(the Arbitration Act) was filed only on 24.03.2005, whereas, as per Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963(the Limitation Act), the limitation period for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act is three years from the date when the cause of action accrues. Accordingly, if calculated from the date of final bill, namely, 27.03.1999, the Section 11 Petition should have been filed on or before 27.03.2002 and, if calculated from the date of commencement of Arbitration, namely, 21.04.1999, the Section 11 Petition should have been filed on or before 21.04.2002. Consequently, he submitted that the Section 11 Petition filed on 24.03.2005 is clearly barred by limitation. In support of this submission, he referred to and relied upon the judgments, which are set out below along with context and principle:

(i) Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (1988) 2 SCC 338, wherein, at paragraph 4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 commences from the date when the dispute arises and is a period of three years from the date when the dispute arose.

(ii) Golden Chariot Recreations Pvt Ltd. Vs. Mukesh Panika & another, (2018) SCC Online Del 10050, wherein, it was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court that a Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, which was filed more than three years after the notice invoking the Arbitration clause, is barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act.

(iii) Panchu Gopal Bose Vs. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta (1993) 4 SCC 338, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the cause of arbitration commences when one parties serves notice on the other party requiring the appointment of an arbitrator and that Section 3 of the Limitation Act applied to arbitral proceedings.

4. He further submitted that this question was not decided in the order passed in the Section 11 Petition, wherein the Court merely recorded that this is a fit case for making a reference under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, he submitted that the question of limitation should have been decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. Instead, he submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the

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