2018 Supreme(Mad) 4564
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
R. SURESH KUMAR, J.
Mervin Rajasekar & Ors. - Petitioners
Versus
The Secretary, Commercial Tax Department & Ors. - Respondents
W.P. No. 529 of 2003
Decided On : 24-08-2018
For the Petitioners: Mr. W.M. Abdul Majeed.
For the Respondents:Mr. P.P. Purushothaman, Government Advocate.
Headnote:
Constitution of India,1950 -Article 226 - Chit Funds Act, 1982 - Section 70 - Limitation Act - Section 5 - Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 - Section 41(2) - Chit Company - claim to be guarantors - Petitioners before this Court claimed to be guarantors as they stood as such for fourth respondent who had been subscriber of chit third respondent - It seems that there had been a default on part of fourth respondent in making subscription to chit and therefore these petitioners who stood as guarantors since equally liable to be prosecuted third respondent Chit Company filed an proceeding before second respondent Though was claimed by petitioners they had been present through their counsel they had not been heard - However second respondent had passed a final order in A.R.C proceeding and passed ex-parte order and allowed said arbitration proceedings filed by third respondent Chit Company against petitioners as well as fourth respondent –Held, Limitation Act especially Section of said Act has not at all been taken away by any expressed provision of Chit Funds Act - only exemption to this aspect is that Section Act as it has expressly taken away Limitation Act that too only two circumstances in clause of sub-section Section - Since sub-section of Section Act specifically provided that the applicability of Limitation Act even before Registrar of Chits under Section of Act certain proceedings same logic can be applied in case of the appeals filed Court is of the considered opinion that the reasoning given by first respondent/Appellate Authority in rejecting appeal filed by petitioners is not correct on ground that it has been filed beyond two months beyond limitation period prescribed Section Act and such belated appeal cannot be entertained by condoning that delay as there was no provision available for such condonation - Therefore impugned order is liable be set aside petitioners for condoning the delay of seven days in preferring the said appeal first respondent shall consider same on merits and on basis of the reasons to be adduced by the petitioners for such delay, which is only minimum by invoking provisions of Section Limitation Act and accordingly pass necessary order and thereafter entertain the main appeal and decide same on merit and in accordance with law above said endeavor shall be undertaken by first respondent within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - Petition disposed
ORDER :
Prayer:- Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records of the first respondent dated 17.09.2002 in letter No.23689/G/2000-1 and quash the same and direct the respondent to take the appeal filed by the petitioners on file.
The prayer sought for herein is for a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records of the first respondent dated 17.09.2002 in letter No.23688/G/2000-1 and quash the same and direct the respondent to take the appeal filed by the petitioners on file.
2. The brief facts which are required to be noticed for the disposal of this writ petition are as follows :- The petitioners before this Court claimed to be guarantors as they stood as such for the fourth respondent, who had been the subscriber of a chit under the third respondent. It seems that, there had been a default on the part of the fourth respondent in making the subscription to the chit and therefore, these petitioners who stood as guarantors, since equally liable to be prosecuted, the third respondent Chit Company filed an A.R.C. proceeding before the second respondent in A.R.C.No.28 of 2000. Though, it was claimed by the petitioners that they had been present through their counsel on 17.08.2000, they had not been heard. However, the second respondent had passed a final order in A.R.C proceeding and passed ex-parte order and allowed the said arbitration proceedings filed by the third respondent Chit Company, against the petitioners as well as the fourth respondent.
3. Feeling aggrieved over the said order passed by the second respondent on 17.08.2000 in the said A.R.C proceeding in A.R.C.No.28 of 2000, the petitioners had filed statutory appeal under Section 70 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 (herein after referred as "Act"). The said appeal was admittedly filed on 24.10.2000. The said appeal filed by the writ petitioners against the order of the second respondent in A.R.C. Proceeding, has been dismissed by the first respondent, vide impugned proceedings dated 17.09.2002, on the ground that the said appeal was filed on 24.10.2000 against the order passed by the second respondent dated 17.08.2000, under Section 70 of the Act, such appeal should have been filed within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, as it cannot be entertained with a delay of seven days, as there was no provision available under the Chit Funds Act to condone the delay of seven days in filing the said appeal and therefore, the said appeal filed by the petitioners was dismissed on the ground of non-availability of provision to condone the delay, by the impugned order of the first respondent dated 17.09.2002. Aggrieved over the said order, the petitioners filed the present writ petition with the aforesaid claim.
4. Mr. W.M. Abdul Majeed learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that, first of all, the said order passed by the second respondent in A.R.C proceeding cannot be sustained on two grounds. Firstly, the writ petitioners stood only as guarantors and without any proceedings against the actual subscriber, who is the fourth respondent, such an award could not have been passed. Secondly, on the date of passing the award, i.e., on 17.08.2000, both the petitioners were represented by their counsel before the second respondent. However, unfortunately, the second respondent passed an ex-parte award stating that on behalf of the petitioners, who were the respondents in the A.R.C. proceeding, no one has appeared. Therefore, the merits of their case was not considered by the Registrar in the A.R.C. proceeding therefore, it necessitated the petitioners to file statutory appeal under Section 70 of the Act.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would further submit that, the order dated 17.08.2000 in A.R.C proceedings was received by the petitioners only a week after. Therefore, the said one week time should be excluded for the purpose of limitation in