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2000 Supreme(SC) 1059

2000(4) Supreme 383
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madras High Court)
S. Saghir Ahmad & G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
P. Sarathy -Appellant
versus
State Bank of India -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 6900 of 1997
Decided on 12-5-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : S.R. Setia, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Sanjay Kapoor, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of a "civil court" but speaks only of a "court". It is not necessary that the court spoken of in Section 14 should be a "civil court". Any Authority or Tribunal having the trappings of a court would be a "court" within the meaning of this Section.

Headnote:Limitation Act, 1963-Section 14-Computation of period of limitation-Exclusion of time taken in prosecuting case in another Civil Proceeding Court-Meaning of-It is not necessary that Court should be Civil Court-Any authority having trappings of a Court would be a Court within Section 14(1)-An Authority Constituted under Section 41(2) of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act is a Court within meaning of Section 14.

       Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of a "civil court" but speaks only of a "court". It is not necessary that the Court spoken of in Section 14 should be a "civil court". Any Authority or Tribunal having the trappings of a Court would be a "Court" within the meaning of this Section. (Para 10)

       The appellant, Branch Manager of a Nationalised Bank was terminated from service in 1983 and appeal there against made to Board of Bank came to be dismissed on 18.5.1983 appeal thereagainst was filed under Section 41(2) of T.N. Shops and Establishments Act which came to be dismissed on 1.9.1987-Thereafter civil suit for declaring that the termination was illegal was filed which was dismissed as barred by limitation.

       Held : The Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals), which was an Authority constituted under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 to hear and decide appeals, was a "court" within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the proceedings pending before him were civil proceedings. It is not disputed that the appeal could file an appeal before the Local Board of the Bank, which was purely a departmental appeal. In this view of the matter, the entire period of time from the date of institution of the departmental appeal as also the period from the date of institution of the appeal under Section 41(2) before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) till it was dismissed will, therefore, have to be excluded for computing the period of limitation for filing the suit in question. If the entire period is excluded, the suit, it is not disputed, would be within time. (Para 13)

       

JUDGMENT

S. Saghir Ahmad, J.-The appellant was appointed as a Clerk in the State Bank of India (for short the respondent ) in 1962. In July, 1977, he was promoted to the post of Branch Manager but on 8th of September, 1980, he was placed under suspension. On 31st of July, 1981, a chargesheet was issued to him which was followed by a regular departmental proceedings and ultimately on 11th of January, 1983, the appellant was removed from service. This order was challenged by the appellant in an appeal filed before the Local Board of the Bank on 21st of February, 1983 but by order dated 18th of May, 1983, the appeal was dismissed. The appellant, thereafter, filed an appeal under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 (for short, the Act ) on 21st of July, 1983. The appeal was filed with the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals), Madras. This appeal was dismissed on 1st of September, 1987 on the ground that the provisions of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 were not applicable to the nationalised Banks as held by the Madras High Court in Management of Bank of India v. C.V. Raman1. This judgment was upheld by this Court on 21st of April, 1988 and is since reported in (1988) 3 SCC 105. It was because of this decision that the appellant s SLP (C) No. 14963 of 1987 against the order of 1st of September, 1988 by which the appeal was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) was dismissed. It was at this stage that the appellant instituted regular suit No. 11099/88 in the City Civil Court, Madras for a declaration that the removal of the appellant was illegal, ultra vires and invalid. He prayed for a decree for reinstatement with consequential benefits. This suit was dismissed by the trial Court by its judgment dated 20th of April, 1994. The trial Court further held that the suit was not within limitation. The first appeal filed, thereafter, by the appellant was allowed on 7th of March, 1995 by the VIII Addl. Judge, Madras with the finding that the suit was not barred by limitation and that the order of dismissal passed against the appellant was bad. The respondent, thereafter, filed a second appeal which was allowed by the Madras High Court on 9th of August, 1996 with the finding that the suit was instituted in the Civil Court beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act. The High Court did not go into the merits of the case. It is in these circumstances that the present appeal has been filed.

2. The only question which falls for our consideration in this appeal is whether the suit instituted by the appellant in the City Civil Court, Madras on 28th of September, 1988 was within time. This suit was filed for the declaration that the order dated 11th of January, 1983, by which he was removed from service, was bad in law. The normal period of limitation within which the suit could have been filed is three years under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. There is another Article, namely, Article 113 which is a residuary Article which provides a period of limitation of three years for filing a suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere.

3. In order to bring a suit within the period of limitation, the appellant claimed benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act on the ground that he had represented to the Local Board and, thereafter, filed an appeal under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and was, therefore, prosecuting "civil proceedings" in a court with due diligence. It is claimed that the entire period during which those proceedings were pending has to be excluded and if this is done, the suit will be well within limitation.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent has, on the contrary, contended that the benefit of Section 14 can be given only if the proceedings were "civil proceedings" and were pending in a court. It is contended that the Appellate Authority under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and E





























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