IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
SENTHILKUMAR RAMAMOORTHY, J.
M/s. Digital Securities Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai – Appellant
Versus
The Registrar of Trademarks Trademarks Registry, Chennai & Another – Respondents
(T)CMA(TM)/11/2023 (OA/33/2011/TM/CH)
Decided On : 16-08-2023
Trademark - Registration of Trademark - Trademarks Act, 1999, Section 21(2), Rule 45 of the Trademarks Rules, 2017, Rule 56(3) of the Trademarks Rules 2002 - The court discussed the abandonment of a trademark application, the grounds for review, and the discretion of the authority in treating an application as abandoned under Rule 56(3) of the 2002 Rules.
Fact of the Case:
The second respondent applied for the registration of a trademark in 1986, and the application was treated as abandoned in 2004. The impugned order allowing the review application was challenged by the appellant.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the impugned order allowing the review application was justified, as the application for registration was not adjudicated on its merits, and the discretion of the authority to treat the application as abandoned was in line with Rule 56(3) of the 2002 Rules.
Issues: The issues revolved around the grounds for review, the discretion of the authority in treating an application as abandoned, and the absence of a provision enabling the setting aside of an ex parte order.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the impugned order allowing the review application was justified based on the completeness of pleadings and evidence, the absence of adjudication on merits, and the discretion vested in the authority under Rule 56(3) of the 2002 Rules.
Final Decision: The impugned order allowing the review application was upheld, and the first respondent was directed to adjudicate the application for registration within three months.
JUDGMENT
(Prayer: Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Appeal (Trademarks) filed under Sections 91, 92 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, praying to set aside the impugned order dated 28th January 2011 passed by the learned Registrar of Trademarks and to allow the opposition or any such further orders.)
An order dated 28.01.2011 allowing the review application of the second respondent is impugned herein. The second respondent herein applied for the registration of a trademark in the year 1986 under Application No.459260. It is not in dispute that the appellant filed a notice of opposition on 11.03.1996; the second respondent filed a counter statement in response thereto on 01.08.1997; the appellant filed evidence in support of the opposition on 04.02.1999; and the second respondent filed evidence in support of the application on 07.03.2000. In effect, the pleadings and evidence were complete. In the context of the matter having been adjourned on about six occasions previously for different reasons, by order dated 08.07.2004, the application for registration of the trademark by the second respondent herein was treated as abandoned for default in prosecution. Upon the second respondent filing a review application, the impugned order was pronounced on 28.01.2011 allowing such review on the ground that there is sufficient reason to allow the review in the interest of justice.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the first respondent recognized that the first two grounds under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, namely, the discovery of new and important matter or evidence or a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, were inapplicable. As regards third ground under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, learned counsel contends that several opportunities were provided to the second respondent by issuing notices of hearing and, therefore, it is completely erroneous to conclude that audi alteram partem was not observed. In this regard, learned counsel refers to the list of dates and events in the appeal and points out that the original order dated 08.07.2004 was issued after about seven hearings at which the second respondent herein was not ready to prosecute the matter.
3. Learned counsel relies upon Rule 56(3) of the Trademarks Rules 2002 (2002 Rules), which were applicable at the relevant point of time. He also points out that the 2002 Rules envisage the filing of Form TM-7, which is a notice of intention to attend hearings, and Form TM-56, which is an application for extension of time. In this case, he submits that the second respondent did not file either Form TM-7 or Form TM-56. Learned counsel concluded his submissions by contending that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would open the floodgates as regards the Trademarks Registry and that no application can be treated as abandoned.
4. In response, learned counsel for the second respondent submits that the relevant trademark is being used by the second respondent from the year 1954. He places emphasis on the fact that pleadings were complete and the entire evidence was already on record. He adverts to the fact that proceedings are pending in the jurisdictional Civil Court as between the contesting parties to this appeal. In effect, learned counsel submits that the impugned order merely set aside an ex parte order by which the applicant lost the substantive right to prosecute the application for registration of the relevant trademark. Therefore, he submits that the impugned order does not call for interference.
5. The facts are largely undisputed, the record shows that the pleadings were complete and parties had placed the relevant evidence on record. The original order does not contain any discussion on the merits of the matter. In relevant part, the said order is as under:
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Application No.459260 in class 30 is treated as abandoned for want of prosecution and the Opposition the
The discretion of the authority in treating an application as abandoned under Rule 56(3) of the 2002 Rules is justified, and the absence of a provision enabling the setting aside of an ex parte order....
The central legal point established in the judgment is the option given to the opponent to adduce evidence or communicate in writing the intention to rely on the facts stated in the notice of opposit....
The court emphasized the importance of the Registrar's decision on the petitioner's request for abandonment being made within a specified time frame and in accordance with principles of natural justi....
Failure to receive hearing notice for opposition proceedings can lead to the setting aside of the abandonment of a trade mark application.
The voluntary nature of abandonment, the strict construction of Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act, and the importance of valid service of opposition notices.
The court emphasized that the legal fiction in Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act should not defeat a substantive right of the petitioner.
Procedural ambiguities in trademark laws should favor the substantive rights of opponents, ensuring that minor delays do not unjustly negate the right to contest trademark registrations.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the time limit for filing the counter statement in trade mark applications, emphasizing the requirement of actual receipt of ....
The main legal point established is the peremptory nature of Rule 50(1) of the Trade Marks Rules 2002 and the statutory sequitur of deemed abandonment under Rule 50(2).
Timeliness in responding to trademark examination reports is crucial, and delays not condoned; rights in the mark persist despite abandonment.
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