The main legal point established is that physical possession must comply with statutory procedures, and subsequent purchasers are entitled to challenge urban land ceiling proceedings after the repeal of the principal Act.

JUDGMENT

(Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letter Patent to set aside the order passed in W.P.No.95 of 2006 dated 20.04.2012 on the file of this Court.

P.B. Balaji, J.

1. This intra court writ appeal has been preferred by the State, aggrieved by the order passed by the writ court in W.P.No.95 of 2006 dated 20.04.2012.

2. The Writ Petition was filed seeking issuance of a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the proceedings dated 18.12.1992 and to consequently forbear the appellants herein from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the respondents, relating to petitioner’s house site property. The writ court found that on the date of repeal of The Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 possession was with the respondent/writ petitioner and on that ground allowed the Writ Petition.

3. The main ground of challenge to the order of the writ court, in the present writ appeal, is that the department had taken possession of the property and all statutory notices had been served on the original owner and therefore the repeal of the parent Act would not have any bearing.

4. We have heard Mr. U.M Ravichandran, Special Government Pleader for the appellants and Mr.R.Ganesh Kumar, learned counsel for the sole respondent. We have also perused the records placed before us.

5. The Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 was repealed on 16.06.1999. The respondent herein had purchased the property in the year 1982 and he was in possession of the same, having constructed a residential building in or around 2005.

6. Section 11(1) notification came to be issued on 31.08.1998 which was also duly gazetted on 14.10.1998. Thereafter, the Section 11(3) declaration was published in the official gazette on 24.11.1998. In pursuance thereof, Section 11(5) notice to take possession of the property was served on the respondent/writ petitioner on 22.04.1999. We also find a communication in NA.Ka.6383/92/B2 dated 24.05.1999, in and by which it is stated that by invoking Section 11(6) possession would be taken by the appellants. It is the case of the appellants that they took possession on 04.06.1999 which was much before the repeal of the Act itself and therefore the respondent/writ petitioner cannot seek to avail the benefit of the repeal Act.

7. However, on perusal of the records we see that the possession said to have been taken on 04.06.1999 is only a symbolic act of taking over possession and reducing the same to writing, by way of a possession certificate. We find that the procedure contemplated under the Act has not been followed. The appellants have to take physical possession of the property in question. Consequent to issuance of the Section 11(5) notice, if the land owner refuses or fails to comply with the demand for surrendering vacant possession under Section 11(5), then it is open to the appellants to take possession by using such force as may be necessary. However, from the records, we do not find that actual physical possession was taken by the appellants. The respondent had also not signed the delivery receipt which is required to evidence the claim of taking over physical possession. Further we also find that in proceedings, Na.Ka.No.6383/92/A2 dated 21.03.2001, it is stated that the excess urban land was handed over to the Tahsildar on 04.06.1999 and in turn on the same day, the Tahsildar handed over possession to the Revenue Inspector. There is nothing to show that the mandate of Section 11(6) was followed and complied with and that forcible possession was taken over from the respondent/writ petitioner. On the contrary, the records available on the file of the appellants also do not indicate that the due process had been followed before taking physical possession forcibly, from the respondent/writ petitioner.

8. The next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the writ petitioner was a subsequent purchaser and therefore he is not entitled to challenge the proceedin