The court affirmed that negligence lies solely with the driver of the other vehicle, and an FIR against the deceased does not constitute conclusive proof of negligence.

JUDGMENT :

(Delivered by Dr. A.D. Maria clete, J)

This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, challenging the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2022, passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Special District Court, Krishnagiri, in M.C.O.P. No. 1032 of 2019.

2. The facts of the case in brief is that on 09.01.2019, when the deceased, husband of the first respondent was driving the Eicher Lorry bearing Reg. No.KA-11-7032, belonging to the fifth respondent and insured with the sixth respondent, in the Krishnagiri Hosur NH Road towards Hosur near Melumalal Kanavai Bridge, the driver of the Ashok Leyland Lorry bearing Reg. No.TN-88-A-4179 belonging to the seventh respondent and insured with the appellant, all of a sudden stopped the Lorry without any signal as a result of which, the deceased hit against the lorry back side and sustained grievous injuries on his vital organs and died on the way to Hospital. The claimant alleged that the accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Ashok Leyland lorry. However, based on a false complaint lodged by the driver of the ongoing lorry, the Gurubarapalli Police registered a case against the deceased in Crime No. 12 of 2019 under Sections 279, 337, and 304A of the IPC. Hence, the respondents 1 to 4 have filed claim petition against the appellant and the respondents 5 to 7 seeking compensation.

3. The fifth and seventh respondents remained exparte before the tribunal. The sixth respondent has filed a counter stating that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the lorry who has stopped the vehicle all of a sudden without any signal and taking advantage of the fatal injuries, the driver of the lorry rushed to the police station and lodged the FIR and hence, they are not liable to pay the compensation. However, the appellant has filed a counter stating that the deceased has driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and hit the lorry and thus, the deceased was a tort-feasor and hence, the respondents 1 to 4 are not entitled for compensation under the Forum for Motor Vehicle Act and they ought to have filed claim petition by adopting the provision of Workmen's Compensation Act.

4. The respondents 1 to 4 have examined two witnesses as PW1 and PW2 and marked 17 documents viz., Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.17. The appellant examined the driver of the seventh respondent as RW1 and no documents have been marked.

5. The Tribunal, after considering the pleadings, documents and materials on records had concluded that the appellant is liable to pay a compensation of Rs.24,07,600/- to the respondents 1 to 4. Challenging the said order, the appellant has come by way of this appeal.

6. The primary contention raised is that the Tribunal failed to consider the negligence of the deceased and instead held that the accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent act of the driver of the third respondent’s vehicle, which was insured with the fourth respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that if the deceased maintained a reasonable speed and distance between the ongoing lorry, he would have had control over his vehicle and accident would not have happened. It is contended that as per Regulation 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, 'the driver of the vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall keep at a sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid collision if the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or stop' and relied on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in ' Nishan Singh and others Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited ' [ (2018) 6 Supreme Court Cases 765 ]. He further submitted that the vicarious liability arises only when the driver of the insured vehicle was tort-feasor and thus, the appellant is not liable to pay compensation to the respondents 1 to 4 and sought for allowing the appeal.

7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 and th