The court ruled that past service of Village Assistants can be counted for pension calculation, emphasizing that each case must be evaluated on its own merits without relying on previous illegal orders.

ORDER :

This writ petition has been filed seeking a direction to the respondents to count the 50% of the petitioner's service as full time GramaKavalar/Thalayari/Village Assistant from 08.12.1989 to 01.06.1995 for the purpose of calculation pension along with the regular service and consequently direct the respondents to pass order to disburse 100% pension for the period between 01.06.1995 and 30.04.2020 with arrears and to send revised pension proposal.

2. The petitioner was appointed as a temporary Village Kavalar/Thalayari/Village Assistant on 16.09.1989. Thereafter, he was regularized vide GO.Ms.No.625 of 1995 Revenue Department dated 01.06.1995. Thereafter the petitioner was promoted to the post of Village Administrative Officer by an order of District Revenue Officer, Virudhunagar. Though he was retired from service, his service from regular regularisation till their retirement only was calculated for pension purpose. His earlier service from the date of joining till the regularisation was not calculated for pensionary benefit.

3. The very same issue has been dealt with by this Court in detailed manner in WP.Nos.18734, 18582, 18738 & 18742 of 2020 dated 18.03.2024, wherein it is held as follows:-

25. In the case on hand, the petitioners have claimed 100% of past services up to 31.05.1995. Before moving further, the points so far settled without any confusion can be jotted down below:-

(i) The inclusion of qualifying service for pension would arise only if the village assistants were made regular on and from 01.06.1995.

(ii) Half of the services of the Village Assistants with effect from 01.06.1995 can be counted, if such service is followed by a regular VAO / Office Assistant through promotion prior to 01.04.2003, as per Rule 11(4) of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules 1978.

26. As stated in the beginning of the discussion in view of the W.P.Nos.18734, 18582, 18738, 18742 of 2020 & WP.Nos.11055, 26256, 11512 of 2021 orders issued by the courts full services were allowed to be included and Government has also been issuing various orders for implementing the above order. However, Mr. Haza Nazruddin pointed out by placing reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Directorate of Film Festivals and others Vs. Gaurav Ashwin Jain and others [reported in (2007) 4 SCC 737 ] that if in any earlier case any favourable order is given in favour of an individual by taking a view contrary to law, the same can not be taken as a precedent in the subsequent case on the ground of equality. In the said judgement it is held as under:

“22. When a grievance of discrimination is made, the High Court cannot just examine whether someone similarly situated has been granted a relief or benefit and then automatically direct grant of such relief or benefit to the person aggrieved. The High Court has to first examine whether the petitioner who has approached the court has established a right, entitling him to the relief sought on the facts and circumstances of the case. In the context of such examination, the fact that some others, who are similarly situated, have been granted relief which the petitioner is seeking, may be of some relevance. But where in law, a writ petitioner has not established a right or is not entitled to relief, the fact that a similarly situated person has been illegally granted relief, is not a ground to direct similar relief to him. That would be enforcing a negative equality by perpetuation of an illegality which is impermissible in law. The principle has been stated by this Court in Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh 10 thus:

"Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent Authority has W.P.Nos.18734, 18582, 18738, 18742 of 2020 & WP.Nos.11055, 26256, 11512 of 2021 passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and v