The court upheld that an amendment to include a declaration of title in a suit is barred by the limitation period defined in Article 58 of the Limitation Act if filed significantly after the right to sue first accrued.

ORDER :

G.R. SWAMINATHAN, J.

1. Heard both sides.

2. The plaintiff in O.S.No.115 of 2012 on the file of the District Munsif (FAC), Madurai Taluk is the revision petitioner herein.

3. The petitioner had originally filed the suit for permanent injunction. She then filed I.A.No.5 of 2023 for amending the plaint to include the relief of declaration. Vide order dated 03.09.2024, the Court below dismissed the petition for amendment. Questioning the same, this civil revision petition has been filed.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner reiterated all the contentions set out in the memorandum of grounds of the civil revision petition and called upon this Court to set aside the impugned order and grant relief as prayed for.

5. I am not swayed by the said submissions.

6. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the suit was instituted way back in the year 2012. The written statement was filed on 12.12.2012 questioning the plaintiff's title over the suit property. The Court below had rightly observed that the plaintiff should have sought the relief of declaration within three years therefrom. The amendment petition was filed with the delay of 11 years. There is a direct decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the point. In L.C.Hanumanthappa V. H.B.Shivakumar ((2015 (6) CTC 562), it was held as follows:-

“13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is not disputed that Article 58 of the LIMITATION ACT would apply to the amended plaint inasmuch as it sought to add the relief of declaration of title to the already existing relief for grant of permanent injunction. In Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. V. Union of India [ (2011) 9 SCC 126 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 484 ] , this Court while construing Article 58 of the LIMITATION ACT held as follows: (SCC pp. 138-39, paras 25-30)

“ Article 58 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, which has a bearing on the decision of this appeal, reads as under:

‘THE SCHEDULE

PLERIOD OF IMITATION

[See Sections 2(j) and 3]

First Division—Suits

Article 120 of the Schedule to the LIMITATION ACT , 1908 (for short ‘the 1908 Act’) which was interpreted in the judgment relied upon by Shri Rohatgi reads as under:

The differences which are discernible from the language of the above reproduced two articles are:

(i) The period of limitation prescribed under Article 120 of the 1908 Act was six years whereas the period of limitation prescribed under the 1963 Act is three years, and

(ii) Under Article 120 of the 1908 Act, the period of limitation commenced when the right to sue accrues. As against this, the period prescribed under Article 58 begins to run when the right to sue first accrues.

Article 120 of the 1908 Act was interpreted by the Judicial Committee in Bolo v. Koklan [ (1929-30) 57 IA 325 : AIR 1930 PC 270 : (1930) 32 LW 338 ] and it was held: (IA p. 331)

‘There can be no “right to sue” until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.’

The same view was reiterated in Annamalai Chettiar v. A.M.K.C.T. Muthukaruppan Chettiar [ ILR (1930) 8 Rang 645 : (1930-31) 58 IA 1 : (1931) 33 LW 30 ] and Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh [ (1930-31) 58 IA 1 25 : (1931) 33 LW 707 ] .

In Rukhmabai v.