The Court emphasized that mere allegations against counsel do not suffice as adequate explanation for a lengthy delay in filing appeals; adherence to statute of limitations is critical.

ORDER :

P.B.BALAJI, J.

The above civil miscellaneous petition has been filed seeking condonation of a delay of 2366 days in preferring the First Appeal against the decree in OS.No.6 of 2008. The revision petitioners are the plaintiffs in the suit, who are claiming a relief of partition.

2. I have heard Mr. Nityaesh Natraj for Mr. Anirudh A. Sriram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.K.V.Babu, learned counsel for the contesting 1^st respondent. I have also gone through the records including the typed set of papers, besides also the decisions that has been relied on by the learned counsels on either side.

3. Mr. Nityaesh Natraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, while fairly conceding that the delay is certainly long, being 2366 days, would however state that the valuable rights of the plaintiffs in immovable property should not be deprived or denied and the delay ought to be condoned. He would further state that the entire period of delay has been properly explained in the affidavit in support of the application. In this regard, he would take me through paragraph Nos.15 to 20 of the affidavit in the above CMP. The learned counsel would also forward a copy of the Encumbrance Certificate applied on 16.03.2024 which has triggered the cause for challenging the decree in the suit.

4. Mr Nityaesh Natraj, learned counsel for the petitioner would also state that the decree of the Trial Court is directly in conflict with the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma & ors., reported in (2020) 9 SCC 1 and the female heirs cannot be deprived of their legitimate interest in the family property. The learned counsel also places reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh , reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 600 and in CMP. (Madurai).No. 1391 of 2023 in the case of the State of Tamil Nadu (rep by the District Collector, etc) v. P. Ramannathan Chettiar and others dated 23.10.2025.

5. Placing reliance on the above decisions, the learned counsel would contend that when the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a liberal approach sub-serving the cause of justice has to be adopted and the physical running of time should not be the criteria, but the real test is as to whether the reason of delay is on account of any negligence on the part of the petitioner which leads to an inference that he has given up his claim. This decision was in fact relied on by this Court in P. Ramannathan Chettiar’s (referred herein supra) case, where a delay of 11926 days was condoned in preferring a Second Appeal.

6. Per contra, Mr.K.V.Babu, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would at the outset contend that the Court, at the stage of considering an application for condonation of delay, cannot go into the merits of the appeal and the scope of enquiry should be limited to the aspect whether the petitioner has made out sufficient cause and explained the delay to the satisfaction of the Court. In this regard, inviting my attention to paragraph Nos.15 to 22, Mr.K.V.Babu, learned counsel for the 1^st respondent would state that the petitioners have attempted to supplant multiple reasons in order to attempt to explain the inordinate delay of more than 7 years. As regards paragraph No.15, Mr K.V.Babu, learned counsel would state that the self- serving claims regarding health ailments have not been established by filing relevant documentary evidence. As regards averments in paragraph No.16, he would state that the petitioners attempts to blame the erstwhile Counsel and contended that this Co