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1951 Supreme(Ori) 38

HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Ray, C. J. And Narasimham, J.
MARAKANDA SAHU - Appellant
Versus
LAL SADANANDA SINGH - Respondent
Civil Revn.  26  Of  1949
Decided On : SEPTEMBER 07, 1951

Advocates Appeared:
B.K.PAL, M.S.Rao

The equitable principle of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act should be applied for the construction of decrees and orders of Courts.

Headnote:

{'KEYWORD': 'LIMITATION', 'SUBJECT': "Interpretation of 'month' in a court order", 'ACT SECTION LIST': ['Section 9, General Clauses Act', 'Section 3 (33), General Clauses Act'], 'SUMMARY': "The court held that the equitable principle of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act should be applied for the construction of decrees and orders of Courts. The expression 'month' in a court order means a British calendar month, and the period of one month should be computed as 30 or 31 days, depending on the number of days in the succeeding month."}

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner's suit was dismissed for default. He filed a restoration petition under Order 9 Rules 8 and 9, C. P. C., which was allowed on condition that he deposits Rs. 100/- towards the costs of the defendants within one month. The petitioner failed to deposit the amount within the time specified, and the court dismissed the restoration petition.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the period of one month given to the petitioner by the Court on 25-10-48 must exclude that day by applying the equitable principles which have been recognised in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and Section 12 (1), Limitation Act. Therefore, the petitioner had time till the end of the Court hours on the 25th November, 1948 and that consequently the Court had no jurisdiction to say on that day that the time had expired and that the Misc. case stands automatically dismissed.

Issues: 1. Whether the principles of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act can be extended to decrees and orders passed by courts? 2. What meaning should be given to the expression 'month' occurring in the order dated 25-10-48.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The equitable principle of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act should, as a general rule, be applied for the construction of decrees and orders of Courts. 2. The expression 'month' in a court order means a British calendar month, and the period of one month should be computed as 30 or 31 days, depending on the number of days in the succeeding month.

Final Decision: The court allowed the revision petition, set aside the orders dated 25-11-48 and 10-12-4s passed by the lower Court and directed the petitioner to pay the costs of Rs, 100/- (one hundred) to the opposite party on or before the 31st October 1951.

NARASIMHAM, J.

( 1 ) THIS revision is against an order dated 25-11-48 passed by the Subordinate judge of Sambalpur in Misc. case No. 14/ 1948 arising out of Title Suit No. 46/1944. The material facts are as follows :-

( 2 ) THE petitioner was the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 46/44 which on 16-3-48 was dismissed for default of the plaintiff. Then he filed a restoration petition under order 9 Rules 8 and 9, C. P. C. This was registered as Misc. case No. 14/1948 and on 25-10-48 the Court after being satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the inability of the plaintiff to proceed with the suit on 16-3-1948, passed the following order :

"this application for the restoration of the suit T. S. No. 46/44 will therefore be allowed if the plaintiff deposits the sum of Rs. 100/- towards the costs of the defendants within one month from this date failing which this application shall stand dismissed but without costs".

( 3 ) ON 25-11-48 the following order was passed by the same court.

"plaintiff does not deposit Rs. 100/- towards the costs of the defendant as per order No. 34 dated 25-10-48 but he applies for time to deposit the said amount. The order dated 25-10-48 leaves no jurisdiction with the Court to enlarge or extend the time allowed, and no separate order is necessary as on expiry of the time allowed this Misc. case stands automatically dismissed".

( 4 ) AGAIN on 10-12-48 the petitioner tendered the sum of Rs. 100/- and requested the Court to condone the delay in payment of the costs. But! the court rejected the prayer in the following order.

"in view of order No. 35 dated 25-11-48 deposit cannot be accepted and time extended. Petition is rejected".

( 5 ) THE petitioner's main contention is the the period of one month given to him by the Court on 25-10-48 must exclude that day by applying the equitable principles which have been recognised in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and Section 12 (1), Limitation Act. Therefore, if the 25th of October 1948 was excluded, the period of one month which would ordinarily mean a calendar month would really expire at 4-30 p. m. on the 25th November, 1948. Mr. Pal therefore urged that his client (the petitioner) had time till the end of the Court hours on the 25th November, 1948 and that consequently the Court had no jurisdiction to say on that day that the time had expired and that the Misc. case stands automatically dismissed.

( 6 ) TWO important questions arise : (1) Whether the principles of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act can be extended to decrees and orders passed by courts; and (2) What meaning should be given to the expression 'month' occurring in the order dated 25-10-48.

( 7 ) SO far as the first question is concerned, there is abundant authority for the view that though Section 9 of the General Clauses Act does not in terms apply to the construction of decrees or orders the equitable principle laid down therein should ordinarily be applied unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context. As pointed out in Halsbury's Laws off England, 2nd Edition, vol. 32, p. 138 :

"when a period of time running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract, and the question arises whether their computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first mentioned or of the last mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purposes for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as 'from such a day' or 'until such a day' are equivocal since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however. the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. Both days must be included if the word 'i















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