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1954 Supreme(Ori) 18

HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Panigrahi, C. J.
SUBARNA SUNAMI - Appellant
Versus
KARTIKA KUDEI - Respondent
Criminal Revn.  298  Of  1953
Decided On : MARCH 09, 1954

Advocates Appeared:
B.Mohapatra, N.K.DAS, S.N.DAS GUPTA

The two months' period prescribed in Section 145(4), Criminal P.C. should be interpreted liberally, excluding the time occupied by the Court or the Police before the passing of the preliminary order.

Headnote:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898 - SECTION 145(4) - DISPOSSESSION - INTERPRETATION - TWO MONTHS' PERIOD - DELAY BY COURT OR POLICE - LEGAL FICTION - ACTUS CURIAE NEMINEM GRAVABIT - SECTION 23(1), LAND ACQUISITION ACT - COLLECTOR'S TAKING POSSESSION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - CONTINUING DAMAGE.

Fact of the Case:

In a proceeding under Section 145, Criminal P.C., the Magistrate declared the possession of the disputed lands in favor of the first party. The Sessions Judge affirmed this order. The second party, claiming to be the daughters of the previous Gaontiar, challenged the order, arguing that the first party had been dispossessed more than two months prior to the passing of the preliminary order, violating Section 145(4).

Finding of the Court:

The Court found that the petitioners were not the daughters of the previous Gaontiar as claimed. The Court also held that the alleged dispossession on 27-4-1952 did not amount to a completed act of forcible driving out of the first party, and that the first apprehension of a breach of the peace arose only on 18-6-1953.

Issues: 1. Whether the dispossession of the first party took place more than two months prior to the passing of the preliminary order, thus violating Section 145(4)? 2. How should the two months' period prescribed in Section 145(4) be interpreted?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the dispossession referred to in Section 145, Criminal P.C. must be one that amounts to a completed act of forcible driving out of a party in possession. The Court found that the alleged dispossession on 27-4-1952 did not meet this criteria. 2. The Court interpreted the two months' period prescribed in Section 145(4) liberally, holding that the delay in deciding the dispute due to the act of the Court or the Police should not be taken into account. The Court reasoned that the Legislature must have been conscious of the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' (an act of Court cannot prejudice a party) when it enacted this provision.

Final Decision: The Court discharged the rule and dismissed the revision, upholding the declaration of possession in favor of the first party.

PANIGRAHI, C. J.

( 1 ) BY an order dated 31-3-1953, the Magistrate, First Class, Bargarh, declared the possession of the disputed lands measuring 51. 052 acres in favour of the first party (opposite paties herein) in M. C. No. 65/314 of 1952 -- a proceeding under section 145, Criminal P. C. The Sessions Judge, Sambalpur, affirmed this order by his judgment dated 30-7-1953, in criminal revision Case No. 6 of 1953. It is against this order that the members of the second party have come up in revision to this Court.

( 2 ) THE facts leading to the dispute lie within a short compass. Akula, the father of the first party was admittedly the Thikadar -- Gaontia, and after his death Kartick the first party, is the Thikadar. The disputed lands are the sir lands of the village enjoyed by the gaontias in lieu of maintenance. The members of the second party claim to be the daughters of one Bhagat who was the cousin of Akula and was the previous gaontiar and who, it is said, died issueless over 20 years ago. It has been found by both the Courts below that the petitioners are, in fact, not the daughters of Bhagat. It is contended that they are the daughters of one Jagat belonging to a junior branch. In view of the findings of the Court below and the overwhelming documentary evidence, learned counsel for- the petitioners did not reagitate this point before me, and it must be taken as established that the petitioners are not the laughters of Bhagat as alleged by them.

( 3 ) BUT apart from that, the main contention raised is that the order of the magistrate violates the provisions Section 145 (4) as the first party had been dispossessed more than two months prior to the passing of the preliminary order. The admit-ed facts are that on 18-8-1952 the members of the second party laid a report with the Police that they had cultivated the disputed fields on akhayatruthiya day, corresponding to 27-4-1952 and that the members of the first party damaged the seedlings on 18-6-1952. It appears that on the same day, viz. , 18-6-1952, the first party reported that the petitioners went armed with lathis and axes and ploughed the disputed lands and sowed paddy that very morning, On 28-6-1952, the Police sent a report recommending immediate action under Section 145, Criminal P. C. and the magistrate drew up a preliminary order on 2-7-1952. On these facts, it is argued that the dispossession of the first party took place on 27-4-1952, that is, more than two months prior to the date of the preliminary order, and that therefore the magistrate had no jurisdiction to declare the possession of the first party. It will be noticed that the petitioners themselves alleged that they had sown paddy on 27-41952, but the members of the first party did not admit that they had been dispossessed on that date. It may well be that by sowing paddy, the petitioners made a sporadic attempt to take the possession of the lands by force on 27-41952. But the first party neither admitted, nor made any complaint about it. It must therefore be held that what the petitioners did on 27-4-1952 did not amount to dispossession of the first party, and that the first apprehension of a breach of the peace arose only on 18-6-1953 when both parties reported to the police against each other about a possible clash. It is well settled that a fugitive act of trespass or interference with possession does not amount to dispossession. The dispossession referred to in Section 145, Criminal P. C. must be one that amounts to a completed act of forcible driving out of a party in possession.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners has referred me to several cases where the first proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145, Criminal P. C. has been considered. There is apparently a divergence of opinion as to whether the two months' period fixed in that proviso should be literally interpreted. If the party approaches the police or the Magistrate complaining of interference with his possession, and if the enq




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