The court interpreted Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act and held that the time spent in prosecuting a civil proceeding in good faith, which is unable to be entertained by the court due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, can be excluded while computing the period of limitation.

G. K. MISRA, J.

( 1 ) DEFENDANT-JUDGMENT-DEBTOR is the petitioner. The opposite party decree-holder filed T. M. S. 46 of 1954 and obtained a preliminary mortgage decree for sale on 12-11-1955. An application for passing a final decree was filed on 8-1-1960. The. Court passed the final decree in the absence of the petitioner without noticing that the application was barred by limitation. In the final decree proceedings, the Court had directed issue of notice on the petitioner. Though she is a permanent resident of village Sabitrapur in the district of midnapur in West Bengal where she resided with her husband and though this address was given in the proceeding upto the passing of the preliminary decree, with a view to keep her in dark and preventing her from objecting to the application for passing of the final decree, which was barred by time, the opposite party took cut notices giving the address of the petitioner as village Parakhi in the district of Balasore, which is far off from Sabitrapur. The opposite party knew that the petitioner was not living at her father's house at Parakhi, which was in the forcible occupation of one Ramprosad Mandal, an agnate of her father, with whom litigation was going on for the last 7 or 8 years. The opposite party procured false, return of service to the effect that the petitioner refused to accept service. As the petitioner was not served with notice, she was kept from the knowledge of her right to oppose the application for passing of the final decree. On 27-12-1960, the petitioner was served with notice under Order 21, Rule 22, C. P. C. , in the proceeding for execution of the final, decree. She gathered knowledge about the passing of the final decree on the date of service of this notice. On the legal advice of Sri Madhusudhan Das, a senior and experienced member of the Balasore. Bar, the petitioner filed an application on 4-1-1961 under order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. for setting aside the ex parte final decree. This application was dismissed on. 28-8-1961 in Misc. case No. 1 of 1961. On 10-10-61 the petitioner filed an application, for review of the final decree which was dismissed on. 28-7-1962, The Civil Revision has been filed against the order of dismissing the application for review.

( 2 ) THE learned Munsif recorded the following findings:

(i) the application for final decree was barred by limitation under Article 181 of the Limitation Act as it had not been filed within 3 years from the date of the preliminary decree, or from the date directing payment of the mortgage money and, that there was an error apparent on the face of the final decree. (ii) the opposite party-decree-holder did not take notice of the correct address and had donel so with an ulterior motive and thereby kept the petitioner front the knowledge of her right to resist the application for passing the final decree on the ground of limitation, and that the petitioner was entitled to extension of time when the fraud first became known to her on 27-12-1960 when the notice under Order 21, Rule 22 c. P. C. was served; and (iii) The petitioner is not entitled to the exclusion, of the period from 41-1961 to 28-8-61 spent in the proceeding under Order 9, Rule 13 C. P. C. in Misc. Case No. 1 of 1961 and that the application for review is barred by limitation under Article 173 of the Limitation Act, as it was not filed within 90 days from the date of the ex parte final decree.

( 3 ) MR. Mukherji does not dispute tnat the notice of the final decree proceedings was not served in the proper address and that by means of fraud the petitioner was kept from the knowledge of her right to object to the passing of the final decree, and of her right to file an application for review of the final decree, and that the time, limited for making the application for review, shall be computed from 27-12-1960 under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, when the fraud first became known to the petitioner. It is also not disputed that if the period