A transferee from the defendant pendente lite is neither a necessary nor a proper party to a suit, as he would be bound by the decree in the suit in view of the principle contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.

AGRAWAL, CJ.

( 1 ) HH This revision by the plaintiffs under S. 115 of the Civil P. C. (for short, 'the Code'), which is directed against an order of the trial court allowing an application for intervention filed by opposite parties 2 to 4, apparently appears simple. But some issues of seminal importance are raised for our determination in view of order of the learned single Judge referring the matter to a Division Bench doubting the correctness of the decision of another learned Judge of this Court.

( 2 ) THE facts briefly noted are as follows :-the petitioners instituted a suit for declaration of their title over certain landed property in which a relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant-opposite party No. 1 from alienating, the suit property was also made. On 20-4-1981, the court passed an order of interim injunction which was ultimately made absolute on 30-9-1981.

( 3 ) IN due course, the hearing of the suit was taken up and was completed on 8-101985, 17-10-85 was fixed for delivery of judgment. At this stage, on 11-10-1985, the invervenets (opposite parties 2 to 4) made an application for their addition as parties to the suit under the provisions of O. 1, R. 10 (2) of the Code on the ground that they had purchased the suit property from the defendant under four registered sale deeds between 28-1-1982 and 18-1-1984. The prayer was resisted by the plaintiff, inter alia, on the ground that the alienations having been made in violation of the order of injunction and also hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, the transactions were void in the eye of law. The further stand of the plaintiff-petitioners was that in any view of the matter, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the interveners were neither necessary nor proper parties and that their presence was not necessary to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate the questions involved in the suit.

( 4 ) THE trial court, however, by the impugned order allowed the application for intervention and allowed the interveners to file written statement on the ground that as the decision the suit would directly affect them, they were necessary parties to the suit.

( 5 ) WHEN the case was being heard by P. C. Misra, J. a contention was advanced on behalf of the petitioners before him that the alienations being invalid on account of the order of injunction, the persons to this illegality could not be implemented as parties. On behalf of the interveners, reference was made to the decision of G. K. Misra, J. (as the then was) in Kusuma Dei. v. Malati Bewa, AIR 1969 Orissa 195 where it has been held that such alienations are not void inasmuch as the only consequence of such transfers in violation of the order of injunction is that the transferor (person injuncted) is liable to be punished and that they should have effect on the validity of title unto the transferee. P. C. Misra, J. could not reconcile himself with the above view as, according to him, the order of injunction prohibiting a person from alienating the property 'suspends his right to transfer and therefore he could not convey' any marketable title.

( 6 ) I have given my anxious consideration to the doubts raised of the learned Judge regarding the correctness of the decision in Kusuma Dei's case. In that case, the learned Judge compared the effect of private alienation of property after attachment with reference to the provision of S. 64 and alienation after an order of injunction passed under O. 39, R. 1 or 2 of the Code. Section 64 bars private alienation of property and declares such alienation to be void. But in the absence of any such embargo, he took the view that the said principle should not be applied to an order of injunction. The learned Judge took support from a decision of the Lahore High Court in Lal Chand v. Sohan Lal, AIR 1938 Lah 220 where the above view was taken, i. e. , that the effect of non-compliance with an order of injunction is only to make the offender l