Orissa High Court
G.K.MISRA,A.MISRA
Madan Mohan Pani - Appellant
Versus
State of Orissa - Respondent
O. J. C. No. 24 of 1971
Decided On : 02/09/1971
ELECTION LAW - PANCHAYAT SAMITI - CHAIRMAN - CONSECUTIVE TERMS - MEANING OF - INTERVENING PERIOD DURING WHICH OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS AS CHAIRMAN - NOT A TERM - NOMINATION OF PETITIONER REJECTED.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner was elected as chairman of Buguda Panchayat Samiti in the district of Ganjam. He assumed charge of the office of the Chairman on 25-1-1961. The term of office under the statute as it then stood was for a period of five years and was due to expire on 25-1-1966. The term of office was extended under Section 46-D of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) till 14-8-1967; but the same was subsequently reduced to 10-4-1967 under Section 46-D proviso (a), when the petitioner made over charge. From 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968 the Sub-Divisional Officer remained in charge of the office of the Chairman under Section 46-D, Proviso (d). There was a fresh election. The petitioner was again elected as Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti and he assumed charge of the office on 15-1-1968. He resigned his office on 12-12-1970. He filed his nomination paper for election of Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti on 26-12-1970. The Election Officer (opposite party No. 3) rejected his nomination under Section 16 (3), Proviso (a), on the ground that the petitioner being Chairman for two consecutive terms was ineligible for the office of Chairman.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the word "consecutive" in Section 16 (3), Proviso (a), connotes continuity and absence of interruption. In between the two terms during which the petitioner was functioning as Chairman, there was a period of gap from 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968 when the Sub-Divisional Officer was in charge of the office under Section 46-D, proviso (d). The impugned order rejecting the nomination is contrary to law.
Issues: Whether the petitioner was eligible to contest the election for the office of Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti for a third consecutive term.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the word "consecutive" in Section 16 (3), Proviso (a), connotes continuity and absence of interruption. In between the two terms during which the petitioner was functioning as Chairman, there was a period of gap from 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968 when the Sub-Divisional Officer was in charge of the office under Section 46-D, proviso (d). The impugned order rejecting the nomination is contrary to law. The court further held that the interregnum wherein an official functions as Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti is not a term and would not break the consecution.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the writ application and upheld the rejection of the petitioner's nomination.
Judgement
G. K. MISRA, C. J. : The petitioner was elected as chairman of Buguda Panchayat Samiti in the district of Ganjam. He assumed charge of the office of the Chairman on 25-1-1961. The term of office under the statute as it then stood was for a period of five years and was due to expire on 25-1-1966. The term of office was extended under Section 46-D of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) till 14-8-1967; but the same was subsequently reduced to 10-4-1967 under Section 46-D proviso (a), when the petitioner made over charge. From 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968 the Sub-Divisional Officer remained in charge of the office of the Chairman under Section 46-D, Proviso (d). There was a fresh election. The petitioner was again elected as Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti and he assumed charge of the office on 15-1-1968. He resigned his office on 12-12-1970. He filed his nomination paper for election of Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti on 26-12-1970. The Election Officer (opposite party No. 3) rejected his nomination under Section 16 (3), Proviso (a), on the ground that the petitioner being Chairman for two consecutive terms was ineligible for the office of Chairman. The impugned order is Annexure 2. These facts were not disputed at the time of hearing.
2. Though a large number of grounds had been taken in the writ application. Mr. Patnaik for the petitioner advanced two contentions; (i) the word "consecutive" in Section 16 (3), Proviso (a), connotes continuity and absence of interruption. In between the two terms during which the petitioner was functioning as Chairman, there was a period of gap from 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968 when the Sub-Divisional Officer was in charge of the office under Section 46-D, proviso (d). The impugned order rejecting the nomination is contrary to law. and (ii) the word "term" used in the section does not include part of a term. As the petitioner had resigned a few days before the expiry of the term of three years, there is no consecution between that term and the term for which election has been held.
3. The second contention was not seriously pressed by Mr. Patnaik and rightly. The word 'term' would include part of a term (see Dictionary of English Law, Jowitt, page 1739). Any construction to the contrary would lead to absurd results. The prohibition in the statute can be easily avoided, as the petitioner has done in this case, by tendering his resignation just a month before the expiry of the term.
4. The word 'consecutive' has the following meanings more or less in all the dictionaries. Those meanings are (i) following in a train, (ii) succeeding one another in a regular order, and (iii) uninterrupted in course or succession.
Mr. Patnaik contends that the statute should be read literally by giving the words used by the Legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. Only if such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. Reliance is placed on AIR 1955 SC 376 (Jugalkishore Saraf v. M/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.) Mr. Mohanty, on the other hand, relies on the principle of construction that in order to get the true import of a statute it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the objects it was to subserve. Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U. P., AIR 1957 SC 532, is relied upon.
Both these principles are well known rules of construction. The object of the impugned proviso clearly is that the same person should not be allowed to function as Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti for more than two consecutive terms. Apparently, the idea is that vested interests will not be allowed to grow in the elective machineries at the lowest rung of organisations for self-government. Even giving a literal meani
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