JUDGMENT

MARKANDEY KATJU, J. — Leave granted

2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judg¬ment of the Madras High Court dated 1.8.2003 in Cr.O.P. No.24782 of 2003.

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The special leave petition was filed 978 days after the delivery of the impugned judgment i.e. after a delay of 888 days. We are not satisfied about the explanation given in the delay condonation application and hence in our opinion the appeal is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

4. Apart from that, we may note that this appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court dated 1.8.2003 by which it quashed the criminal case instituted by the appellant against her husband who is respondent in this case being Crime No.35 of 2000 under Sections 498A and 406 IPC read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

5. Admittedly the appellant has also filed a maintenance case against the respondent. The appellant and respondent were married with each other on 14.11.1996 but the marriage did not work out. The husband had filed a petition before the First Additional Family Court, Chennai seeking a declaration that his marriage with appellant was null and void but he withdrew that petition stating that he wishes to resume marital life and that petition was dismissed by the Family Court on 9.7.2003.

6. By the impugned judgment the High Court relying on the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana & another, AIR 2003 SC 1386 quashed the criminal case filed by the appellant against her husband. It is against this judgment of the High Court dated 1.8.2003 that this appeal has been filed by the wife-appellant under Article 136 of the Constitution.

7. In this connection we may clarify the scope of Article 136. Article 136 of the Constitution is not a regular forum of appeal at all. It is a residual provision which enables the Supreme Court to interfere with the judgment or order of any Court or tribunal in India in its discretion.

Article 136(1) of the Constitution states :

“Article 136(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India.”

8. The use of the words “in its discretion” in Article 136 clearly indicates that Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal upon any party but merely vests a discretion in the Su¬preme Court to interfere in exceptional cases vide M/s. Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Their Employees, AIR 1959 SC 633 (635), Kunhayammed & others v. State of Kerala & another, 2000(6) SCC 359 and State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry, AIR 1960 SC 391 (395). In Municipal Board, Pratabgarh & another. v. Mahendra Singh Chawla & others, 1982 (3) SCC 331 and in Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2003(3) SCT 694 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 2889 (vide para 43 & 45), this Court observed that under Article 136 it was not bound to set aside an order even if it was not in conformity with law, since the power under Article 136 was discretionary.

9. Though the discretionary power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 is apparently not subject to any limita¬tion, the Court has itself imposed certain limitations upon its own powers vide Ram Saran Das and Bros. v. Commercial Tax Offi¬cer, Calcutta & others, AIR 1962 SC 1326 (1328) and Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, 2000(6) SCC 359 (para 13). The Supreme Court has laid down that this power has to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only. Thus, in Pritam Singh v. The State, AIR 1950 SC 169, this Court observed (vide para 9) as under :

“On a careful examination of Article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as f