Judgment

SINHA, C.J.I. : This is a direct appeal by special leave granted by this Court on September 7, 1959, against the order, dated June 17, 1959, passed by the first respondent - the Commercial Tax Officer - assessing the appellant to central sales tax amounting to Rs. 42,647 odd, for the period July 30, 1957 to March 31, 1958, under the Central Sales Tax Act (LXXIV of 1956) - which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act. The second respondent is the State of West Bengal, an the third respondent is the Union of India.

2. In view of the order we propose to make in this case, it is not necessary to state in any detail the facts and circumstances leading up to this appeal. The appellant is a partnership firm, under the Indian Partnership Act, with its principal place of business at 18 Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of the first respondent. The appellant alleges that he carries on business of two kinds, namely, (1) of a dealer in coal and coke, and (2) of a middleman bringing about sales coal and coke between Colliery owners and consumers. In respect of its business as a dealer, the appellant is a registered dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act (Bengal Act VI of 1941). Its second business as a middleman relates mainly to sales of coal and coke in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and the tax in question relates to this second branch of its business. The Act came into operation in the State of West Bengal on July 1, 1957, when the appellant applied for and obtained a certificate of registration under the Act on July 30, 1957. In May 1958, the appellant made its return under the Act in respect of the period aforesaid, showing the turnover as nil. But in spite of its showing cause against the proposed assessment, the first respondent determined Rs. 9,17,196 as the appellant s turnover in respect of the period aforesaid and assessed central sales tax thereon at Rs. 42,647.82 nP. under S. 8(2) of the Act, and issued Demand Notice. The appellant moved this Court and obtained the special leave to appeal from the order of the first respondent making assessment, and later a demand on the basis of the assessment.

3. From the statement of fact given above, it is clear that the appellant did not exhaust all his remedies under the Act itself, and came directly to this Court as if the Order of Assessment passed by the first respondent was final. The question, therefore, arises whether this Court should entertain the appeal, when even the facts have not been finally determined by the final fact-finding authority under the Act, nor has the jurisdiction of the High Court been invoked to exercise its powers under the Act. But Mr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the appellant, has contended in the first instance that the powers of this Court are wide enough to enable him to approach this Court direct, when, according to him, there had been an assessment of tax without the authority of law. There is no doubt that the powers of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution are as wide as they could be, because, unlike the preceding articles of the Constitution, there is no limitation that the judgment, decree or order should be final in the sense that the appellant in this Court has exhausted all the remedies provided by law before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court to grant "special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any case or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India." In spite of the wide amplitude of the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain appeals by special leave, this Court has imposed certain limitations on its own powers for very good reasons, and has refused ordinarily to entertain such appeals when the litigant has not availed himself of the ordinary remedies available to him at law. But Mr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the appellant, invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Mahadayal Premchandra v. Comm