An order which is passed at an interlocutory stage of a criminal proceeding, but is for all intents and purposes final and cannot be corrected or its effect cannot be nullified at any later stage, cannot and should not be regarded as an interlocutory order so as to come within the ban provided under Section 397(2) Cr. P.C., debarring the courts to assess the correctness and/or the legality of such an order at the proper time.

JUDGEMENT

1. The first party in a proceeding u/s. 145 Cr. P.C., has preferred this revision against the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur in Criminal Revision No. 23(3) (S) of 1974-75 remanding the case to the trial court for a fresh determination of the question of possession involved in this proceeding after taking into consideration the affidavits sworn and the written statements filed in the Court of the S.D.O., Sambalpur and in the court of Shri A.R. Sabat, another First Class Magistrate at Sambalpur. In view of the limited question involved in this revision, it is not necessary for me to state here the respective cases put forward by the contesting parties on the question of possession of the disputed property.

2. Mr. Basu, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, at the outset opposed the maintainability of this revision on the ground that the impugned order being an interlocutory order in the proceeding, S.397 (2), Cr. P.C., 1973, bars a revision against such an order. According to Mr. Basu, the proceeding u/s. 145 Cr. P.C., is still alive, and so the impugned order passed in the said proceeding is merely an interlocutory order, and so no revision is maintainable against that order as provided under S.397(2) Cr. P.C., 1973. Mr. Swain, the learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand contends that the impugned order is a final order for all intents and purposes and its effect cannot be questioned or remedied at any later stage and so it does not come within the purview of S.397 (2) Cr. P.C., 1973.

3. The Criminal P.C. does not define an "interlocutory order." The word "interlocutory" is used in juxtaposition to the word "final". The meanings of those words, as has been held in the case reported in AIR 1968 SC 733: (1968 Cri LJ 876) (Mohanlal Maganlal v. State of Gujarat), have to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which they are required to be interpreted. No singular test can be applied to determine whether an order is final or interlocutory. In the said case it has been held that "an interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." The expression "interlocutory order" has again been considered in Smt. Parmeshwari Devi's case (AIR 1977 SC 403): (1977 Cri LJ 245). In this case the trial court made an order summoning Smt Parmeshwari Devi to attend the court with some documents The applications for revision preferred by Smt. Parmeshwari Devi were dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court of Delhi. By obtaining special leave she preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court against the order of the Delhi High Court. In the Supreme Court it was argued that the aforesaid order of the Magistrate was an interlocutory order and the power of revision conferred by sub-sec. (1) of S.397, Cr. P.C., 1973 could not be exercised in relation to the said order by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of that section. In dealing with this matter their Lordships referred with approval to the above-quoted observation regarding interlocutory order made in the decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 733: (1968 Cri LJ 876) (supra), and observed as follows:-

" ............ It may thus be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made, and it may also be conclusive as to a person, who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, against whom it is directed. As has been shown, the order of the Magistrate dated August 8, 1974 was not according to law and it adversely affected the appellant, who was not a party to the enquiry or trial, as it was solely directed against her. As is obvious, she could have no opportunity to challenge it after the making of the final order, and such a belated challenge would have been purposeless for it would have given her no relief. So in so far as the appellant is concerned, the order of the Magistrate could not be said to be an interlocutory order and the