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1983 Supreme(Ori) 31

ORISSA HIGH COURT
Dr. B. N. MISRA, J.
RUPA JENA AND OTHERS
VERSUS
TAPAI SWAIN & OTHERS
Criminal Revn. No.272 of 1982,
Decided on : 21 -3 -1983.

An order of attachment under Section 146(1) of the Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order and the Magistrate is not required to provide reasons for the attachment.

Headnote:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 146(1) - ATTACHMENT OF SUBJECT OF DISPUTE - ORDER OF ATTACHMENT - INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - REVISION - MAINTAINABILITY - REASONS FOR ATTACHMENT - NECESSITY.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners challenged an order passed by the Executive Magistrate under Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) attaching the subject of dispute and appointing a receiver. The petitioners argued that the order was an interlocutory order and therefore not subject to revision under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. They also contended that the order was void as the Magistrate had not provided any reasons for the attachment.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the order of attachment was not an interlocutory order as it substantially affected the rights of the parties. The court further held that the Magistrate was not required to provide reasons for the attachment as Section 146(1) of the Cr.P.C. did not specifically require such reasons.

Issues: 1. Whether the order of attachment was an interlocutory order and therefore not subject to revision under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C.? 2. Whether the order was void as the Magistrate had not provided any reasons for the attachment?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the order of attachment was not an interlocutory order as it substantially affected the rights of the parties. The court relied on the Supreme Court decisions in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, which held that an order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. 2. The court held that the Magistrate was not required to provide reasons for the attachment as Section 146(1) of the Cr.P.C. did not specifically require such reasons. The court relied on its own decision in Kasinath Sahu v. Dandasi Khatai, which held that Section 146(1) of the Cr.P.C. does not categorically provide that the Magistrate must record reasons before passing an order under that section.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision petition and confirmed the order of the Magistrate.

JUDGEMENT

1. This revision is directed against the order dated 22-6-1982 passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Bhanjanagar under Section 146(1) of the Cr.P.C. (hereafter referred as the 'Code') in M.C. No.74 of 1982, a proceeding under S.145 of the Code. The petitioners are members of the second party and the opposite parties are members of the first party in the S.145, Cr.P.C. proceeding referred to above. On 16-3-1982 the present opposite parties filed a petition under Section 145 of the Code and on that date, the learned Executive Magistrate initiated the present proceeding and issued orders under Section 145(1) of the Code. On 17-5-1982 the opposite parties filed a petition for attachment of the disputed land. On 2-6-1982 the learned Magistrate heard arguments on both sides and by order dated 22-6-1982 directed attachment of the disputed land. The Revenue Inspector, Bargam was appointed as the receiver and he was directed to put the disputed land to public auction. It is this order of the learned Magistrate which is challenged in this revision.

2. Section 146(1) of the Code empowers the Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute in three cases, i.e.,-

(i) if it is a case of emergency or

(ii) if it is decided that none of the parties was in possession; or

(iii) if no derision is possible as to which of them was in possession.

The order of attachment remains in force until a competent Court decides the rights of the parties or until the Magistrate, on being satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace, with-draws it. In the event a receiver is subsequently appointed in relation to the subject of dispute by any Civil Court, the receiver appointed by the Magistrate is required to handover the subject of dispute to the receiver appointed by the Civil Court. In the present case, the learned Magistrate has passed the order of attachment during the pendency of the S.145, Cr.P.C. proceeding before him.

3. Mr. M. Patra, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties, has raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the present revision, application. It is submitted that an order under S.146(1) of the Code is an interlocutory order and as such the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is barred under sub-section (2) of S.397 of the Code. In support of this contention, reliance is placed in 1978 Cri LJ 1822 (All). Smt. Premalata v. Ram Lubhaya and 1982 Cri LJ 124 (Punj and Har), Sishu v. State of Haryana. Mr. M.K. De, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has, on the other hand, submitted that an order parsed under Section 146(1) of the Code is not an interlocutory order and therefore the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is not barred under law and in support of this contention the learned counsel relies on (1978) 22 Mad LJ (Cri) 232 : (1978 Cri LJ (NOC) 214) (Kant), Parvatewwa v. Kamalawwa and 1981 Cri LJ 958 (Bom), Hasmukh J. Jhaveri v. Shella Dadlani.

4. First of all, I would refer to the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 : (1977 Cri LJ 1891), wherein the Supreme Court observed (at pages 1894-95)-

XX XX XX

The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the con-notation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to he appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "in






































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