JUDGMENT

S.K. MISHRA, J. : This application is filed by the petitioner assailing the order dated 8.11.2013 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kendrapara in Criminal Revision No.20/2013. The revision application was filed under Sections 399 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code” for brevity). Section 399 of the Code provides for the Sessions Judge’s power revision. Section 397 of the Code provides for the power to call for records to exercise of power by the High Court and the Court of Session. So the initial question that arose wether Sub-section (3) of Section 397 is a bar for a second application by the petitioner. Sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code provides that if an application under Section 397 of the Code has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. Thus, there is a bar regarding a second application against the order passed by learned Sessions Judge.

2.However, in course of hearing learned counsel for the relied upon the case of Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and another; (1997) 13 OCR (SC)-41. At paragraph-10 the Supreme Court has held that when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code a person-accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. The Supreme Court has further held that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the Courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensure.

3.It is seen that the petitioner was found to be transporting I.D. Liquor which is punishable under Section 47(a) of the Bihar and Orissa excise Act. The petitioner thereafter filed an application before the learned J.M.F.C., Aul in G.R. Case No.240/2013 to release the said vehicle. The vehicle was not released. The application was rejected by the learned J.M.F.C., Aul. The petitioner preferred a revision application before the learned Sessions Judge, Kendrapara, who as per the judgment dated 8.11.2013, on a careful analysis of the documents, rejecting the application.

4.In this case, on the face of record, it cannot be said that there has been a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the Court or the required statutory procedure was not complied with. There is hardly any scope of interfering with the judgment passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kendrapara.

5.Before parting with this case, this Court takes note of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge held that the learned Single Judge in Soubhagya Kumar Panda v. State of Orissa; (2003) 25 OCR-449 has referred the matter to the Larger Bench. So in view of the provisions of the OLR Act for confiscation of the seized vehicle in question can be released by the Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Section 457 of the Code remains res integra. This is erroneous. In fact in the case of Rajat Kumar Pattanayak v. State of Orissa (2003) 24 OCR-426, a Division Bench of this Court having taken into consideration the provision of Section 68 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act has held that the Collector or any Excise Officer so empowered in any case in which any property has been seized is liable to confiscation under Section 66 may at any time before the Magistrate has passed an order under Section 67, Sub-section (1), r