Mere threats or abusive words, when accompanied by gestures or signs that could reasonably infer resistance to the public servant's duty, constitute obstruction under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. Physical force is not necessary to prove obstruction, and the public servant's decision to abstain from discharging duty out of prudence is sufficient to establish obstruction.

JUDGMENT :

Narasimham, C.J. - This is a revision against the appellate judgment of the Assistant Additional Sessions Judge. Cuttack maintaining the conviction of the Petitioners u/s 186 of the Indian Penal Code but reducing the sentence passed on them by a 1st Class Magistrate to a fine of Rs. 50/- each.

2. On 17-5-1957 the Chakla Kanungo (p.w. l) went to the house of the Petitioner, Abhiram Sahani with a distress warrant issued in a Certificate Case in which the said Abhiram was the certificate-debtor. He demanded the dues from Abhiram but when the latter refused to pay anything he told him that he would attach his moveable properties. Thereupon it was alleged that the Petitioners said in Oriya:

Do you consider it to be Firingi Raj? Let us see how you attach the property.

These statements were made in a loud tone with red eyes. The Kanungo got frightened and did not execute the warrant but in formed the authorities. On this report a case was started u/s 186 I. P. C. which ended in their convictions. The main contention raised by Mr. Rao on behalf of the Petitioner is that the aforesaid words uttered by the Petitioners would not suffice to show that there was "Obstruction" within the meaning of Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The old view based on Lahore decision reported in 110 Indian Cases 101 to the effect that there must be actual physical obstruction may now be taken as too narrow a view in the light of subsequent decisions. Thus in I. L. R. 60 Calcutta 149 it was observed:

It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what does or does not constitute an obstruction within the meaning of Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. Each case must be decided upon its own particular facts and circumstances. In some instances mere threats may not of themselves constitute obstruction, but threats of violence, particularly if such threats are coupled with an aggressive or menacing attitude and accompanied by the flourishing or exhibition of some kind of weapon capable of inflicting physical injury, and if they so affect the public servant concerned as to cause him to abstain from proceeding with the execution of his duties, would amount to such obstruction.

3. A similar principle was laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Nanhua Vs. Emperor where it is pointed out that where a public servant was prevented from discharging his duty the exact means employed by the accused if he acts intentionally do not matter. In 177 IC 819 also it was held that where with the deliberate intention of preventing a public servant from holding an auction the accused persons by means of abuses and threats prevent him from doing his duty, their action would amount to obstruction u/s 184 I.P.C. though to prove obstruction u/s 186 I. P. C. some show of physical force was necessary.

4. With respect I am inclined to follow the Calcutta view mentioned above from which the latter Allahabad and Nagpur decisions do not materially differ. Though mere threat or abusive words may not suffice, the question ultimately is whether those words were accompanied by gestures or other signs from which the public servant could reasonably infer that any attempt by him to discharge his duty would be resisted and thereupon, out of prudence, be decides to abstain from discharging his duty. It cannot be said that a public servant should attempt to discharge his duty notwithstanding the threats and should actually receive some blows before he could be said to have been "obstructed". Here the words were used in a taunting manner in a loud tone and the Petitioners showed red eyes. The Kanungo was therefore justified in inferring that any further attempt by him to execute the warrant would be met by physical force resulting in injuries to him. The Petitioners cannot take advantage of the fact that the Kanungo was not rash enough to invite further trouble on himself by persisting in the discharge of his duties even after the Petitioners had made their intention absolutely c