The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the nature of the power conferred on the State Government and the S.T.A. or R.T.A. in granting temporary permits, and the requirement for the State Government to periodically examine the public interest for which a notification imposing a moratorium was issued.

JUDGMENT :

Pradipta Ray, J. - The writ petitioner has been plying one of his vehicles in the route from Sambalpur in Orissa to Raipur in Madhya Pradesh on the basis of a temporary permit granted in his favour. The petitioner applied for a second temporary permit for the aforesaid Sambalpur-Raipur route in respect of his vehicle bearing No. OIS 5100. By letter dated December 22, 1999 the Under Secretary of the State Transport Authority, Orissa informed the petitioner that the Transport Commissioner and Chairman, State Transport Authority was pleased to reject the petitioner's application for temporary permit in view of the State Government's Notification No. 15077 dated November 17, 1998. It appears that the State Government issued the above Notification dated November 17, 1998 in exercise of its powers conferred by Clause (iii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 67 of the Motor Vehicles Act giving the following direction both to the State Transport Authority (in short 'S.T.A.') and the Regional Transport Authorities (in short 'R.T.A.')

No new temporary permit shall be issued or countersigned by the State Transport Authority or any Regional Transport Authority in respect of Stage Carriages for introduction of additional services on any inter-state route except the existing services operating in the existing inter-State routes until further direction.

In this writ application the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid Notification dated November 17,1998.

2. The main submission as made by Mr. Rao, learned Advocate for the petitioner in support of the challenge is that u/s 67(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') the State Government cannot issue any order or direction in respect of any quasi-judicial power of the S.T.A. and the R.T.A. According to Mr. Rao, grant of temporary permit u/s 87 of the Act is a quasi-judicial power and beyond the pale of any administrative orders issued by the State Government.

3. Mr. Rao relies upon a decision of the Supreme court in B. Rajagopala Naidu Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others. In B. Rajagopala's case the Supreme Court was considering the legality of an order issued by the State Government of Madras u/s 43A as inserted by the State amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by which the State of Madras introduced a method of awarding marks to be adopted by the State Transport Authority or the R.T.A., while considering applications for grant of permits. In the said context the Supreme Court held:

In interpreting Section 43-A, we think, it would be legitimate to assume that the Legislature intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law, that in exercising their authority and in discharging their quasi-judicial function the Tribunal constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment. It is of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of the Judge or the Tribunal must be absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State. If the exercise of the discretion conferred on a quasi-judicial Tribunal is controlled by any such direction, that forges fetters on the exercise of quasi-judicial authority and the presence of such fetters would make the exercise of such authority completely inconsistent with the well-accepted motion of judicial process. It is true that law can regulate the exercise of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provisions on what matters the Tribunals constituted by it should adjudicate. It may by specific provisions lay down the principles which have to be followed by the Tribunals in dealing with the said matters. The scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted by Statute can well be regulated by the statute and principles for guidance of the said Tribunals may also be prescribed subject of course to the inevitable requirement that