1. Challenge to the validity of a Government Order issued under Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, regarding permit grant criteria and marking systems. (Para 1 , 2 , 8 )
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1964 Supreme(SC) 63
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
5th March, 1964
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.
B. Rajagopala Naidu, Appellant
Versus
The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and others, Respondents; The Anamallais Bus Transport (P) Ltd. Pollachi, Coimbatore District Madras State, Intervener.
Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1964.
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. Mohan Kumara Mangalam Senior Advocate, (Mr. M. N. Rangachari, Advocate and M/s. R. K. Garg and M. K. Ramamurthi, Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi and Co. with him), for Appellant; Mr. R. Ganapthy Iyer, Advocate for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3; Mr. A. Ranganadham Chetty, Senior Advocate, (Mr. A. V. Rangam, Advocate with him), for Respondent No. 4; Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Senior Advocate (Mr. N. C. Krishna Iyengar, Advocate, and Mr. Onkar Chand Mathur, Advocate of Messrs. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Intervener.
Advocates:
A.RANGANADHAM CHETTY, A.V.RANGAM, J.B.DADACHAN, M.K.RAMAMURTHI, M.N.RANGACHARI, N.C.K.IYENGAR, OMKAR CHAND MATHUR, R.Ganapathy Iyer, R.K.GARG, RAMAMURTHI, S.MOHAN KUMARA MANGALAM
A.RANGANADHAM CHETTY, A.V.RANGAM, J.B.DADACHAN, M.K.RAMAMURTHI, M.N.RANGACHARI, N.C.K.IYENGAR, OMKAR CHAND MATHUR, R.Ganapathy Iyer, R.K.GARG, RAMAMURTHI, S.MOHAN KUMARA MANGALAM
Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, empowers the State Government to issue administrative directions only; it does not permit the government to regulate the quasi-judicial functions of transport authorities, which would otherwise require statutory rules subject to legislative oversight.
Headnote:(A) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - Section 43A - Validity of government orders issued to transport authorities - Whether directions issued under Section 43A can regulate the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, such as the grant of permits - Power under Section 43A is limited to administrative functions and does not extend to directing the outcome of quasi-judicial proceedings. (Paras 10, 15, 16)
(B) Administrative Law - Quasi-judicial functions - Distinction between legislative, judicial, and administrative powers of the State Government - Legislative powers (Sections 67 and 68) are subject to statutory safeguards like publication and legislative oversight under Section 133 - Administrative directions under Section 43A cannot bypass these safeguards to regulate quasi-judicial determinations. (Paras 12, 13, 15)
Facts of the case:
A bus operator challenged the grant of permits to other operators by an appellate tribunal. The tribunal had used a marking system prescribed by a government order issued under Section 43A of the Act. The operator contended that the government order was invalid as it exceeded the authority conferred by Section 43A.
Findings of Court:
The court observed that the Act distinguishes between legislative, judicial, and administrative powers. While the language of Section 43A is wide, its context and the surrounding sections indicate it is intended for administrative directions. The process of granting permits is a quasi-judicial function.
Issues: Whether a government order issued under Section 43A of the Act, which prescribes a marking system for the grant of permits, is valid, or whether such power is limited to administrative matters.
Ratio Decidendi: The power conferred by Section 43A is limited to issuing directions of an administrative character. It does not authorize the government to issue directions that regulate the exercise of quasi-judicial authority by transport tribunals, as such regulation would require statutory rules subject to legislative control and publication under Section 133.
Result: The court held that the scope of Section 43A is limited to administrative functions and does not include the exercise of quasi-judicial authority.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether a Government Order prescribing marking systems and screening criteria for permits falls within the administrative authority conferred by Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act. (Para 1 )
3. The court distinguished between legislative, judicial, and administrative powers, noting that permit grants are quasi-judicial functions and Section 43A confers only administrative authority. (Para 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 )
4. Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act confers power to issue directions of an administrative character, which cannot regulate the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. (Para 7 , 10 , 16 )
5. What is the nature of the power conferred on the State Government under Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act?
The power is administrative or executive in character, intended to clothe the Government with authority to issue directions of an administrative nature, rather than legislative rules or judicial orders. (Para 7 , 10 , 16 )
6. Can administrative directions issued under Section 43A regulate the quasi-judicial functions of transport authorities?
No, the court observed that the field covered by Section 43A is administrative and does not include the area subject to the exercise of quasi-judicial authority by relevant Tribunals. (Para 12 , 16 )
7. Do administrative directions issued under Section 43A confer enforceable legal rights on citizens?
No, such directions are binding on the transport authorities for guidance but do not confer rights on citizens; thus, their contravention cannot be corrected via a writ under Article 226. (Para 9 , 10 )
Judgment
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I. : The short but important point of law which has been raised for our decision in this appeal by special leave is whether G. O. No. 1298 issued by the Government of Madras on April 28, 1956 in exercise of its powers conferred by S. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) (hereinafter called the Act) inserted by the Madras Amending Act 20 of 1948, is valid. Mr. Mohan Kumara Managalam who appears for the appellant contends that the impugned Government order is invalid for the simple reason that it is outside the purview of S. 43A. The impugned order was issued as early as 1956 and since then, its validity has never been impeached in judicial proceedings. Litigation in regard to the grant of permits under the relevant provisions of the Act has figured prominently in the Madras High Court in the form of writ petitions invoking the said High Court s jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution and several aspects of the impugned order have come to be examined. The echoes of such litigation have frequently been heard in this Court and this Court has had occasion to deal with the impugned order, its character, its scope and its effect; but on no occasion in the past, the validity of the order appears to have been questioned. The Legislative and judicial background of the order and the course of judicial decisions in regard to the points raised in the enforcement of this order would prima facie and at the first blush suggest that the attack against the validity of the order may not be well-founded and that would tend to make the initial judicial response to the said challenge more hesitant and reluctant. But Mr. Kumara Mangalam contends that S. 43A under which the order purports to have been passed would clearly show that the said order is outside the purview of the authority conferred on the State Government and is therefore invalid. It is obvious that if this contention is upheld, its impact on the administration of the system adopted in the State of Madras for granting permits under the Act would be very great and so though the question lies within a narrow compass, it needs to be very carefully examined. The facts which lead to the present appeal conform to the usual pattern of the permit litigation in which the grant or refusal to grant a permit is challenged under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226.
2. The appellant B. Rajagopala Naidu is a bus operator in the State of Madras and he runs a number of buses on various routes. On June 26, 1956, the State Transport Authority by a notification invited applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits on the route Madras to Krishnagiri. The buses on this route were to be run as express service. The appellant and 117 bus operators including respondents 2 and 3 D. Rajabahar Mudaliar, proprietor of Sri Sambandamoorthy Bus Service and K. H. Hanumantha Rao, proprietor of Jeevajyoti Bus Service respectively, submitted applications for the two permits in question. The State Transport Authority considered the said applications on the merits. In doing so, it proceeded to award marks in accordance with the principles prescribed by the impugned order and came to the conclusion that the appellant satisfied the requirements enunciated by the State Transport Authority for running an efficient bus service on this long route, and so, it granted the two permits to the appellant on May 8, 1958.
3. Against this decision 18 appeals were preferred by the unsuccessful applicants including respondents 2 and 3. All these appeals were heard together by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras in June 1959. It appears that before the appeals were thus heard, the State Government had superseded the principles enunciated in the order in so far as they related to the grant of stage carriage permits and had issued another direction under S. 43A known as G. O. 2265 on August 9, 1958, Incidentally, it may be added that by this order
