A legal practitioner co-opted to the executive committee and nominated as an officer to give legal advice is not an 'officer' of the association for the purpose of representing the employer under Section 36(2)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

ORDER

B.L. Hansaria, C.J. - Shri S.B. Nanda, a leading labour lawyer of the State, wanted to appear on behalf of the management of M/s. Kalinga Studios Ltd., the petitioner, as an 'officer' of the Utkal Chamber of Commerce and Industries Ltd., and the prayer having been refused by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, this application has been filed stating that the petitioner was entitled to be represented by Shri Nanda because of what has been stated in Section 36(2)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter, 'the Act').

2. There is no dispute that the aforesaid provision allows an officer of an association of employers, of which he is a member, to represent the employer in any proceeding under the Act. The only other relevant provision, which is necessary to be noted, is Sub-section (4) of Section 36, which has stated that in any proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be. The present is admittedly not a case falling within Sub-section (4) and the only provision pressed into service is Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 36. Let us see whether the case comes within the fold of that clause.

3. The decision of the apex Court on this aspect is that of Paradip Port Trust, Paradip Vs. Their Workmen. Relying on this decision Shri Misra submits that the impugned order is not sustainable as it is urged that there is no scope for enquiry by the Tribunal into the motive for appointment of a legal practitioner as an officer of the employer's association, as stated in paragraph 16 of the judgment (p. 414). We shall advert to motive later; but first, let it be seen as to the ground on which the Presiding Officer rejected the application of the petitioner to be represented by Shri Nanda.

4. The learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that Shri Nanda was neither under the administrative control of the Utkal Chamber of Commerce and Industries Ltd., nor did he receive any remuneration from that association; and his name had been included as a co-opted member only to give legal advice and conduct cases on behalf of the employer. This view had been taken after adverting to the decision of the Assam High Court in Sarbeswar Bardoloi v. Industrial Tribunal AIR 1955 Gua 148. In that case also the Court was seized with the question as to when a legal advisor of an association can be allowed to represent the members of the association. The Bench applied its mind as to the purport of the word 'officer' appearing in Sections 36(2) (a) and (b). Ram Labhaya, J., who wrote the leading judgment, stated in paragraph 8 that the word 'officer' has not been defined in the Act and it did not admit of any easy definition. As to the dictionary meanings, it was stated that though they are of some assistance, the same may not be binding on the Courts who have to ascertain the meaning of terms with reference to the context in which they occur. Even so, the meaning given to the word 'officer' in the Oxford Dictionary was noted, according to which the word 'officer* means one who holds office. In relation to companies or societies, it is a person who holds and takes part in the management or direction of a society or institution, for instance, one who is holding the office of President, Treasurer or Secretary. It was, however, observed that this list is not exhaustive, and a practicing lawyer may conceivably be an officer, but the description of 'legal advisor' without reference to the terms of his appointment and the duties of the office would not be enough for a finding that he is an officer of the company. The learned Judge acknowledged that the statement made by him was negative in character, but found it difficult to lay down a positive rule and stated that each case has to be decided on its own facts, while