The court can condone delays in filing complaints under the Negotiable Instruments Act if satisfied with a sufficient cause, assessing the substance of justice over technicalities.

Judgment :

G. Satapathy, J.

1. This appeal against acquittal under Section 378 (4) of the CrPC is directed against the impugned judgment dated 21.03.2016 passed by the learned JMFC-Civil Judge (Jr. Divn), Rourkela in 1CC No.455 of 2013 acquitting the accused Respondent herein of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, “the Act”) clearly on the ground of delay in presenting the complaint before the concerned Court and that too, without delay being condoned.

2. In the course of hearing, neither the counsel for the appellant nor the Respondent dispute the aforesaid factual aspect of acquittal of the accused on the ground of delay of one day, but Mr. Malaya Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant submits that in fact no delay has been occasioned in filing the complaint, in view of the Ext.7 which discloses that the demand notice was returned by the postal authority after keeping it for seven days which came to the knowledge of the complainant on 30.04.2013, but by taking into account a stray admission made by the complainant in his Examination-in-Chief that the accused received the information from the postal authority on 23.04.2013, the learned trial Court erroneously calculating the period of limitation to present the complaint has returned with the finding that the complaint was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, which is contrary to the law and weight of evidence and thereby, such impugned judgment needs to be set aside.

3. On the contrary, Mr. H.B. Dash, learned counsel for the Respondent vehemently opposes and submits that not only the appellant has admitted about the fact that the demand notice was received by the Accused-Respondent on 23.04.2013, but also no application for condonation of delay has been filed to condone the delay in presenting the complaint and, therefore, the impugned judgment does not appear to be contrary to the provisions of law. Mr. Dash accordingly prays to dismiss the appeal.

4. In view of the rival submission, the only disputed question remains to be solved is whether the demand notice was served on the Accused-Respondent on 23.04.2013 or 30.04.2013, but it is an admitted fact that the paragraph-5 of the Examination-in-Chief of the complainant contains a statement that the accused received the information from the postal authority on 23.04.2013, but fact remains that Ext.7, the certified copy of which is produced before this Court by Mr. Malaya Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant indicates the endorsement of the postal authority “Addressee not available after deposit seven days. Hence, it return to sender” with signature of the postal authority superscribed below such endorsement with date 30.04.2013. Further, the learned trial Court at paragraph-12 of the impugned judgment has presumed that the notice has been served on the addressee (Respondent), but on perusal of such document under Ext.7, the learned trial Court has found that the notice was returned because the addressee was not available even after deposit of such notice by the postal authority for seven days.

5. In view of the aforesaid facts and taking into account the provision of Section 138 (c) of the Act, which prescribes that unless the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice, it can be well said that the “limitation of fifteen days” for payment of the cheque amount as aforesaid would start to run after receipt of the demand notice by the drawer of the cheque.