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1994 Supreme(P&H) 765

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
A.P.Chowdhri and Harmohinder Kaur Sandhu JJ.
Amita Baghi
Versus
Tejwinder Singh Alias Teji
First Appeal First Order No. 971 of 1994,
Decided On : SEPTEMBER 7, 1994

An order under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not amount to an award or an interim award and, therefore, appeal under Sec. 173 of the Act does not lie.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 - SEC. 140 - NO FAULT LIABILITY - APPEAL AGAINST ORDER UNDER SEC. 140 - NOT MAINTAINABLE - SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT UNDER ART. 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION CAN BE INVOKED IN APPROPRIATE CASES.

Fact of the Case:

Claimants filed a petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation for the death of their husband/father in an accident involving two vehicles. The Tribunal directed the owner of one of the vehicles to deposit Rs. 12,500/- under Sec. 140 of the Act as no-fault liability.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that an appeal against an order under Sec. 140 of the Act is not maintainable under Sec. 173 of the Act. However, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution and quashed the impugned order, directing the owner of the vehicle to pay Rs. 25,000/- to the claimants under Sec. 140 of the Act.

Issues: 1. Whether an appeal lies against an order under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988? 2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in allowing 50% amount on account of no-fault liability under Sec. 140 of the Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. An order under Sec. 140 of the Act does not amount to an award or an interim award and, therefore, appeal under Sec. 173 of the Act does not lie. 2. The words "jointly and severally" occurring in Sec. 140(1) of the Act furnish the key to understand that where more than one vehicle is involved in the accident, which results in death or permanent disablement of any person, the owners of such vehicles are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation on the principle of no-fault liability. 3. Where there is a dispute between the parties as to who was responsible for causing the accident, the inter se dispute is not required to be adjudicated before passing an order under Sec. 140(1). 4. A direction under Sec. 140 is based on no-fault principle and there is absolutely no reason to say that an order under Sec. 140 decides the extent of the liability of the owners of the two vehicles involved in the accident.

Final Decision: The High Court quashed the impugned order and directed the owner of the vehicle to pay Rs. 25,000/- to the claimants under Sec. 140 of the Act.

Judgment

1. One Sunil Baghi, owner of Maruti Car NLV 103 died as a result of accident, which involved Maruti Van No. PB-05-222 7/07/1992. The widow of two minor sons of the deceased filed a claim petition in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ferozepur. Inter alia, a prayer was made in the claim petition for the grant of Rs. 25,000.00 on account of no fault liability under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The aforesaid prayer having been opposed by counsel appearing for the owner of the Maruti Van, the learned Tribunal directed the owner of the Maruti Van to deposit Rs. 12,500.00- under Sec. 140 of the Act. Aggrieved by the order, the claimants have preferred this appeal.

2. A preliminary objection has been taken by learned counsel appearing for the owner of the Maruti Van, namely, that the appeal is not competent. His further stand is that the impugned order is justified in view of the decision by a Division Bench of this Court in Shamsher Singh V/s. Gurnam Singh, FAO No. 682 of 1989 decided on 4/09/1989.

3. We have heard Mr. Ravinder Chopra for the appellants and Mr. R. S. Aulakh for respondent No. 1. Two questions arise :

(i) Whether the present appeal is competent ? (ii) Whether the tribunal was justified in allowing 50 per cent amount on account of no fault liability under Sec. 140 of the Act.?

4. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. V/s. Mohinddin Kureshi, 1994 ACJ 74 a Division Bench of Patna High Court dealt with the question of maintainability of appeal against an order passed under Sec. 140 of the Act. The Bench noted conflict of judicial opinion between United India Insurance Company Ltd. V/s. Padmawati, 1990 ACJ 751 (Kerala) on the one hand and Gaya Prasad V/s. Suresh Kumar, 1992 ACJ 200 (Madhya Pradesh - Full Bench). Agreeing with the conclusion reached in the decision of the Kerala High Court, it was held that the appeal was maintainable.

5. The contention of Mr. Chopra, learned counsel for the appellants, is that apart from the aforesaid decision of the Patna High Court, which approves the view taken by the Kerala High Court (supra) the same view has been accepted by this Court. He places reliance on : (1) Mano Devi V/s. Chander Singh, 1994 (1) PLR 666; (2) Smt. Bimla Devi V/s. National Insurance Company, 1988 (2) CLJ 518 (Full Bench).

6. Mr. Aulakh, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, on the other hand, has contended that the order under Sec. 140 of the Act does not tantamount to an award or an interim award and, therefore, no appeal is competent under Sec. 173 of the Act. He relied on Deepak Dewan V/s. Shanti Dewan, 1993 (1) ACJ 122 (Delhi).

7. After careful consideration, we are of the view that an order under Sec. 140 does not amount to an award or an interim award and, therefore, appeal under Sec. 173 of the Act does not lie. The reasons in support of the above conclusion are as follows :-

(1) Sub-section (1) of Sec. 140 of the Act expressly deals with a situation where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of more than one motor vehicles. It has further been expressly laid down that no fault liability of the owners of such vehicles shall be joint and several. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 140 of the Act reads as under :-

"140 (1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section." In our view, the words jointly and severally occurring in the above provision furnishes the key to understand that where more than one vehicle is involved in the accident, which results in death or permanent disablement of any person, the owners of such vehicles are jointly and severally liable to pay compensatio



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