Termination of service of a workman on the ground of absence from duty amounts to termination by way of punishment and requires an enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

G.S.Singhvi, J.

1. Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh 19.6.1991 (Annexure P4) upholding the termination of the service of the petitioner has been made subject matter of challenge in this writ petition filed by the petitioner (workman).

2. Brief facts,--

The petitioner was appointed in the service of Salal Hydro Electrical Project Jyotipuram (Jammu and Kashmir) as a daily rated worker in June, 1977. He was made work charged employee w.e.f. 22.5.1979 and was paid salary in the grade of Rs. 210-290. On 10.10.1984, petitioners wife died in fire incident. After some days his small daughter also died. The petitioner applied for grant of leave and proceeded for his home town. According to the petitioner, he fall sick due to mental shock and agony which he had suffered due to death of his wife and young daughter and remained under treatment for a long period between 15.1.1985 to 15.1.1987. He submitted his joining report alongwith medical certificate to the Assistant Engineer but the same were not .accepted. He, therefore, raised an industrial dispute and the Government of India referred the same to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh, for adjudication.

3. In his statement of claim, the petitioner questioned the action taken by the employer on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The employer defended the action of terminating the service of the petitioner w.e.f. 11.1.1985 on the basis of the provisions contained in clause 17 of the Certified Standing Orders. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court examined the rival pleadings and took note of the arguments advanced before it by the representatives of the parties and held that the termination of the service of the petitioner was justified in view of the provisions contained in clause 17 of the Certified Standing orders and the workman must be deemed to have voluntarily abandoned his employment by remaining absent from duty without leave. In taking this view, the Tribunal placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Buckingan and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1272, and National Engineering Industry Ltd. v. Hanuman. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 33. The Tribunal has also held that the termination of the service of petitioner would be treated as covered by Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 1947 Act. In support of this view, the Tribunal placed reliance on the decision in Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. v. R.V. Krishna Rao, 1990(1) LLJ 87 and Tata Enginering and Locomative Co. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi, 1990(1) LLJ 403.

4. Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the termination of service of the workman on the ground of absence from duty amounts to termination by way of punishment because absence from duty is one of the misconduct enumerated in para 28.53 of the Certified Standing Orders and before the petitioner could be punished on the basis of the allegation of misconduct, it was imperative for the employer to have made an enquiry against the petitioner in terms of clause 34 of the Certified Standing Orders. Learned counsel argued that failure of the employer to hold enquiry in accordance with the provisions of clause 34 of the Certified Standing Orders has the effect of rendering employers act as illegal and contrary to the basic principles of natural justice. Learned counsel further submitted that the termination within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the 1947 Act and the Tribunal has seriously erred in overlooking this aspect of the matter.

5. Shri P.K. Mutneja learned counsel for respondent No. 2 raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Chandigarh to adjudicate the dispute by arguing that the petitioner was posted in Jammu and Kashmir at the relevant time and, therefore the Tribun