The Magistrate has the power to grant remand of an accused or suspected person under Section 167(2) of the CrPC read with Section 36-A(1)(b) of the NDPS Act till the investigation is completed and the case is committed to the Court of Session. Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which imposes limitations on granting bail, does not override the provisions of Section 167(2) of the CrPC, which deals with the total period of custody of the accused during investigation.

SAROJNEI SAKSENA, J.

1. The factual matrix of Cril. Misc. No. 9322-M of 1993 is that the petitioner-accused was arrested under Section 15 of the Naroctic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, the Act) for keeping in his possession 10 Kgs. of poppy husk without a requisite licence. He was produced before Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Mansa, for remand. Initially he was remanded to police custody and later on to judicial custody. His bail application was declined by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bathinda. In the aforesaid Crl. Misc. petition the petitioners learned counsel contended that under clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 36-A of the Act the Judicial Magistrate could not grant remand beyond the period exceeding 15 days in the whole. Hence the order of remand granted by the Judicial Magistrate rendered the petitioners detention illegal and on this count he is entitled to bail. He placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court in Berlin Joseph V/s. State, 1992 (2) Crimes 353.

2. The prayer was opposed by the Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab, who contended that a Full Bench of Orissa High Court in Banka Dass V/s. State of Orissa, 1993 (2) RCR 285 has taken a contrary view. Thereupon the learned single Judge, considering the direct conflict of opinion with regard to the interpretation of Section 36-A(1)(b) of the Act, came to the conclusion that the matter be placed before Hon ble the Chief Justice for referring it to a larger Bench. Accordingly, the matter was placed before a Division Bench of this Court.

3. This Division Bench by its order dated November 30, 1993, before which a Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ram Dayal V/s. Central Narcotic Bureau, Gwalior, 1993 (1) RCR 264 was also referred to, thought it fit that in view of the aforementioned three Full Bench decisions, a Full Bench of this Court be constituted to resolve the above-referred controversy. The Division Bench framed the following questions for adjudication by the Full Bench :-

i) Whether a Judicial Magistrate can give remand of the accused beyond a period of fifteen days in all as indicated in Section 36-A(1)(b) of the Act ? and

ii) Whether the provisions of Section 37 of the Act relating to grant of bail override the provisions of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ?

Thus, this Full Bench was constituted to adjudicate upon the above-referred two questions.

4. Before grappling with the problems posed before us, it is necessary to look into the legislative history of the Act. From a comprehensive survey of the provisions and the objects of the enactment, it is obvious that this Act was enacted to provide stringent provisions for control and regulation of trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The legislative intent to make the provisions more stringent and to thwart attempts by the accused to slip through the loopholes is apparent from Act No. 2 of 1989 coming into force with effect from May 29, 1989, which inter alia substituted Sections 36, 36-A to 36-D and 37 of the Act.

5. Statutes imposing penalty and punishment are to be strictly construed. To enforce a penalty it must be clear that the case is within the letter and spirit of the statute. However, the language of the Parliament although not to be extended beyond its fair construction is not to be interpreted in so slavishly literal a way as to stultify the manifest purpose of the legislature. The intention of the legislature must be given effect to as expressed in the language of the provisions. Where, however, usual meaning of a language falls short of the whole object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be given to the words if they are fairly susceptible of it. (See Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad V/s. Ben Hiraben Manilal, AIR 1983 SC 537. In other words, interpretation would be such as would advance intendment and thwart the mischief it was enacted to suppress and to keep t