The State Government has the power to extend the period for execution of a scheme under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, if it is satisfied on material that the Trust could not execute the scheme within the period prescribed for reasons beyond its control.

G.R.MAJITHIA, J.

1. L.P. As Nos. 394, 395, 396 and 442 of 1983 are being disposed of by a common judgment as common question of law and fact is involved therein.

2. The only question surviving for consideration, as directed by the apex Court relates to the constitutional validity of Sec.44A of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 , as enforced in Haryana (for short "the Act") and the notifications issued from time to time under the proviso to the said section granting extension of the period for the completion of the scheme.

3. The relevant facts for appreciation of the question involved briefly are that vide notification No. 7111-3CI-76/22899 dated July 7, 1976, the Governor of Haryana in exercise of power under Sec.41(1) of the Act sanctioned Development Scheme No. 23 prepared by the Bhiwani Improvement Trust, Bhiwani, under Sec.24 read with sub-sec. (2) of Sec.28 of the said Act. As enjoined by sub-sec. (1) of Sec.42 of the Act, the scheme was also notified. The scheme was not executed within a period of five years from the date of issue of notification under sub-sec. (1) of Sec.42 of the Act. Vide Notification No. 14/36/3CI-80 dated October 13, 1980, the Governor of Haryana extended the period for the execution of the scheme for a period of three years from July 7, 1981 to July 6, 1986 (1984?).

4. The persons aggrieved by the action of the State Government extending the period for execution of the scheme challenged the same through various writ petitions in this Court. The writ petitions were allowed by a single Judge of this Court on February 14, 1983. Municipal Committee, Bhiwani, aggrieved by the decision of the learned single Judge filed letters Patent appeals which were also dismissed. The Municipal Committee then went up in appeals before the apex Court by filing Special Leave Petitions. The same were disposed of by an order dated March 5, 1987, with the following directions :-

"We have heard the learned counsel for the parties in all these appeals. We do not agree with the decision of the High Court that the schemes involved in these cases were liable to be set aside on the basis of the reasons given by the Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Radhey Sham Gupta V/s. State of Haryana, AIR 982 Punj and Har 519. We, therefore, set aside the judgments against which these appeals are filed and remand the case to the High Court to consider only the question relating to the constitutional validity of Sec.44A of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 , as in force in Haryana and the Notifications issued from time to time under the proviso to the said section granting extension of the period for the completion of the schemes in question. No other question shall be raised before the High Court by the writ petitioners. It is open to the writ petitioners to file, if they are so advised, additional pleadings confined to the above question. It is also open to the respondents to file additional counter-affidavits in the High Court. The High Court shall dispose of the writ petitions within six months. Status quo as on today regarding possession shall be maintained until the High Court disposes of the writ petitions. The appeals are disposed of accordingly." Additional pleading were filed by the parties as directed by the apex Court. On the expiry of the period extended vide notification dated October 13, 1980, the State of Haryana vide notification dated July 3, 1983, extended the period for the execution of the scheme for a further period of two years from July 7, 1984 to July 6, 1986. On July 2, 1986, the period for the execution of the scheme was further extended for a period of two years from July 7, 1986 to July 6, 1988. The scheme was not executed within the extended period. The State of Haryana vide notification No. 14/36/80-iiiC dated July 4, 1988 extended the period up to July 6, 1991. The vires of Sec.44 of the Act has been challenged on the grounds that it gives unguided and unfettered power to t