The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain and decide a suit challenging the assessment of octroi duty by a Municipal Committee is barred by sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, if the dispute is a matter covered by the Act.

A.N.Grover, J.

1. The question which requires determination is whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain and decide a suit in which the main issue is whether certain goods fell under one item or the other of the Schedule under which octroi duty was chargeable by the Municipal Committee was barred by virtue of the provisions contained in sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911.

2. The plaintiffs were dealers in sports and carried on business within the Municipal limits of Municipal Committee, Batala. In the course of their business they imported what were called "lathis" (of cane). According to them, they were liable to pay octroi duty at the rate of-/2/- per maund either under item No. 105 or 110 of the Octroi Schedule but the Municipal Committee had assessed them under the residuary item, No. 122 which imposed a duty of Rs. 2 per maund. They, therefore, filed a suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant Committee from levying octroi duty at the rate of Rs. 2/- per maund on imported cane. The defendant Committee took objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain and decide a suit of this nature and further pleaded that the goods had been rightly assessed under the residuary item. The trial Court was of the view that such a suit could proceed in the Civil Courts and gave a finding that the octroi duty could be levied on the goods in question under item 105 only and that the residuary, item was not applicable. The suit was consequently decreed. On appeal the learned Senior Sub Judge held that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and on that ground it was dismissed. When the matter came before the learned Single Judge in second appeal, he was of the opinion that in view of conflict of authority prevailing in this Court it should be referred to a Division Bench. It came before a Division Bench by which it has been referred to a Full Bench.

The relevant sections may first be reproduced- "84. (1) An appeal against the assessment or levy of any or against the refusal to refund any tax under this Act shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner or to such other office as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf: Provided that, when the Deputy Commissioner or such other officer as aforesaid, is, or was when the tax was imposed, a member of the committee, the appeal shall lie to the State Government.

(2) If, on the hearing of an appeal under the section, any question as to the liability to, or the principle of assessment of, a tax arises on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable doubt, he may, either of his own motion or on the application of any person interested, draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained, and refer the statement with his own opinion on the point for the decision of the High Court.

(3) On a reference being made under sub-section (2), the subsequent proceedings in this case shall be, as nearly as may be, in conformity with the rules relating to reference to the High Court contained in section 113 and Order XLVI of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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86. (1) No objection shall be taken to any valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act.

(2) No refund of any tax shall be claimable by any person otherwise that in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules thereunder."

3. The entire ambit and scope of the bar created by these sections was discussed at great length and decide authoritatively in the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Municipal Committee, Montgomery V/s. Master Sant Singh, AIR 1940 Lah 377. It is unnecessary to refer to the earlier decisions of the Chief Court and the Lahore High Court on the point as there is hardly and dispute between the learned counsel for the parties with regard