The right of pre-emption under Section 15(1)(c) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, is confined to sales of land or property owned jointly or made by all co-sharers jointly. Tenants holding under tenancy of vendors or any one of them are entitled to the fourth place to claim the right. The amendment of the Act is not retrospective, and the right of pre-emption must continue to exist from the date of sale to the date of the decree. A pre-emptor is not entitled to improve his status after the date of sale.

I.D.Dua, J.

1. Regular Second Appeal No. 1781 of 1960 and Nos. 80 and 81 of 1961 will be disposed of together because they raise the same question of law. As a matter of fact, the three suits, out of which these three regular second appeals arise, were consolidated and disposed of by a single judgment by the trial Court and appeals from them were also decided by one judgment by the learned Additional District Judge, Karnal.

The facts so far as relevant for our present purpose are that Megh Raj owned land measuring 808 Kanals and 13 Marlas equivalent to 70 standard acres in village Bhallar. He transferred one-third share of the said land to each of his two sons, Baldev Raj and Janak Raj, on 20th December, 1956. Thereafter, Megh Raj and both of his sons sold their respective shares in the said land separately to Tara Singh and others, vendees, for a consideration of Rs. 17,000/- in one sale and Rs. 16,000/- each in the remaining two sales. These three sales were effected on 4th June, 1957. Six suits pre-emption were filed in respect of these three sales. Three suits filed by Harwant Singh were, however later withdrawn because of the recent amendment in the law of pre-emption. The other three suits instituted by Naurata and others were fought out to the end and it is three suits which are now the subject-matter of the three appeals before me. The plaintiffs in the present controversy claimed their right of pre-emption on the basis of section 17 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act of 1953, they also asserted the right to pre-empt the sales in question on the ground that they were Biswedars in the village.

The vendees resisted the suit on various grounds and the trial proceeded on a large number of issues. The controversy on appeal, however, has centered round a very short point with the result that it is not necessary to refer to all the issues framed. The question which has been agitated before me on second appeal merely relates to the effect of the amendment of the Punjab Pre-emption Act on the present suits and is thus confined to the first issue relating to the plea of a superior right of pre-emption of the plaintiffs as compared with the vendees. In the trial Court it was urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that since they are the tenants of the land in dispute under the vendors, they are entitled to pre-empt all the sales by virtue of their being mere tenants under the amended law of pre-emption. This contention did not find favour with the trial Court which observed that the sales having taken place in June, 1957 the rights of the parties with respect to the pre-emption to the sales must be determined in the light of the provisions of the law of pre-emption which existed at that time. The contention urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that since no decree in pre-emption suits could be passed in consistent with the provisions of the amended Act, as laid down in Section 31 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act irrespective of the date of the institution of the suit the Court could not dismiss the suit if the plaintiffs were entitled to a pre-emption decree because the dismissal of the suit which also amounts to a decree would be inconsistent with the amended Act, was repelled by the trial Court. While doing so, the Court observed that Section 31 merely provides that in the pre-emption suit, whether instituted before or after the amendment, no decree could be passed in consistently with the provisions of the amended Act. According to the Court the word decree mentioned in Section 31, as amended, did not include dismissal of the suit. The Court also observed that the right of pre-emption simply gives a right of substitution and not of re-purchase with the result that the pre-emptor in order to succeed must prove the existence of his right at the time of the sale, at the time of the institution of the suit and also at the time of the decree. In the case in hand the right to pre-empt in the capacity of a tenant was not possess