The power of a widow to adopt under custom is strictly construed and must be exercised within the narrow limits circumscribed by the entry in the riwaj-i-am.

1. This is a petition filed by Lachhmi Narain under O. XLVII, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for review of my judgment dated 11-8-1958 in Lachhmi Narain V/s. Ghisa etc., Regular Second Appeal No. 524 of 1954. The appeal had been filed by Lachhmi Narain defendant against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two Courts below holding that he had failed to show his adoption to be valid. Mr. Daljit Singh who had appeared on behalf of the appellant-petitioner in Regular Second Appeal No. 524 of 1954 had contended that the entry in the riwaj-i-am as to the person who could be adopted is always construed to be indicatory and not mandatory. In support of his contention, the counsel had relied on Shitab Singh V/s. Hazari Singh, ILR 7 Lah 117: (AIR 1926 Lah 207) and Jowala V/s. Dewan Singh, AIR 1936 Lah 237. These two cases were distinguished in the judgment given by me. In AIR 1936 Lah 237 the power of a male to adopt a remoter collateral, although a nearer collateral is in existence, was considered and I was of the opinion that this decision could not help the appellants counsel in the instant case where the power of a widow to adopt is concerned. In ILR 7 Lah 117: (AIR 1926 Lah 207) Rajput widow of Gurgaon District was held authorised to adopt one of her husbands male collaterals as her husbands heir and therefore I considered this authority also distinguishable. The view that I took in my decision dated 11-8-1958 was that a widow, normally speaking has no power to adopt under custom and that if such a power is conferred by the entry in Wilsons Tribal Custom for Gurgaon, it must be exercised strictly within the narrow limits circumscribed by the entry itself. The appellant admittedly is not one of the widows husbands made relatives related through males, as prescribed in the entry in question. No other authority was brought to my notice at the time of the hearing of the appeal.

2. Mr. Ram Sarup has, in support of his petition for review, submitted that in some cases elating to Brahmans of the old Delhi territory, in which the village of the appellant was included before 1911, when Delhi was created as a separate province, consent of the collaterals of widows husband was not material if the widow had been given the power to adopt her deceased husband. Without deciding whether or not such instances are relevant for the purposes of determining the validity of the adoption in the present case, this contention obviously cannot prevail when I am asked to review my previous decision. As early as 1922 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Chhajju Ram V/s. Neki, ILR 3 Lah, 127: (AIR 1922 PC 112), laid down in explicit terms that a Court hearing an application for a review of a decree of a decree made on appeal has no power to order a review upon the ground that the decision was wrong on the merits. Viscount Haldane, who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council, made the following important observations:

"They (their Lordships) think that Ruld1 of Order XLVII must be read as in itself definitive of the limits within which review is today permitted, and the reference to practice under former and different statutes is misleading. So construing it, they interpret the words any other sufficient reason as meaning a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously."

This view was reiterated in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi V/s. Parath Nath, AIR 1934 PC 213.

3 M. Ram Sarup next contended that my attention at the time of the hearing of the appeal was not drawn to three very important decisions which, if brought to my notice, would have changed the fate of the decision of the appeal. The first of such authorities to which he has drawn my attention is Basant Singh V/s. Brij Raj Saran Singh, AIR 1935 PC 132, in which it is laid down that the restriction that adoptee should be of the same gotra is only a recommendation, and a person of a different gotra may be adopted by doctrine of