The judgment establishes the need for due process of law in evicting a tenant at sufferance and the protection of possession until dispossessed by due process of law.

Hemant Gupta, J.

1. The defendant is in appeal before this Court aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court whereby the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-appellant from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff over the agricultural land measuring 35 kanals 7 tnarlas was decreed.

2. The plaintiff has sought injunction inter-alia on the ground that one Ram Diya was recorded in possession of the suit land as Giar Marussi. In the column of payment of rent, the entry was Bai Shera Malkan, Bai Vaja Kabza Derina. It was alleged that Ram Diya has never paid any Batai or lagan in cash of any kind and by prescription of time the said trespasser has become owner of the suit land. The plaintiff has alleged that he was inducted as tenant by Ram Diya vide lease deed dated 30.12.1968 and after the expiry of lease period, the plaintiff is in possession as a statutory tenant and thus the defendants cannot dispossess him.

3. Defendants No. l, 13 and 14 contested the suit and it was pleaded that Ram Diya was Dohlidar in respect of the suit land. He died unmarried and issueless. After the death of Ram Diya the suit land has reverted to the owners. It was denied that the respondents were threatening to dispossess the appellant. However, in a separate written statement, the defendant-appellant alleged that he was in possession of the land since 15.6.2000 when the suit land was lying vacant. After the expiry of lease period of 29.12,1998 the suit land has reverted to the original owner and the appellant is in possession thereof.

4. The first Appellate Court found that the plaintiff has not become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession as Ram Diya during his life time has never said to be in adverse possession against the defendant. The plaintiff who is only a lessee from Ram Diya cannot be said to have become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession. Thus the plaintiff is a tenant at sufferance after the expiry of lease period. However, the learned first Appellate Court granted injunction restraining the appellant from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff as it was found that there is no proof of surrender of possession in favour of the appellant. The first Appellate Court found that in normal course of events, a person in possession as a lessee-does not surrender the possession of his own. It is only when a person is compelled or forced, he surrenders the possession. Thus the first Appellate Court found that the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction.

5. Finding of fact has been recorded by the first Appellate Court that possession has not been surrendered by the plaintiff to the defendant and that the appellant has not taken over possession in June, 2000. Such finding does not call for any interference as it is a possible finding in law on the basis of appreciation of evidence.

6. Before this Court the learned counsel for the appellants has argued that after the expiry of lease period on 29.12.1998, the possession of the plaintiff was that of a tenant at sufferance. The tenant at sufferance is a trespasser and therefore, a trespasser is not entitled to injunction against a true owner. Reliance was placed upon Kewal Chanel Mimani (Dead) by Lrs. v. S.K. Sen, 2001(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 746: Prataprai N. Kothari v. John Braganza, 1999(2) S.L.J. 1466 and Roshan alias Roshan Lal and Ors. v. The Secretary, Govt. of Haryana and Ors., 1998(2) P.L.J, 260. However, the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has no merit. After the expiry of lease period, the status of the plaintiff is that of a tenant at sufference as there is no evidence of acceptance of rent by the landlord. He would be a tenant holding over if the landlord has accepted the rent. A tenant by sufference does not require notice before he could be evicted but whether the defendant has a right to take over possession of the land simply on the expiry of lease period is a questio