The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973, particularly Section 15, and the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Order 9 Rule 13, in the context of intentional delay and absence from proceedings.

M.K.Kumar, J.

1. This petition filed under Sub-Section 6 of Section 15 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction), Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is directed against the judgment of the Appellate Authority, Narnaul, dated September 22, 1988. The Appellate Authority had dismissed the appeal of the tenant-petitioner on the ground of limitation observing that the tenant-petitioner had been intentionally delaying the proceedings because after tendering the rent on August 03.1984, he filed the written statement on October 27, 1984 and thereafter, he never appeared. On December, 13, 1984, he was proceeded exparte and two years thereafter, the Rent Controller passed the order ejecting him from the demised premises on the ground that he had caused material impairment to the demised premises and had ceased to occupy the same for a period of 3 to 4 years preceding the filing of the ejectment petition, which was instituted on February 10, 1984. The Appellate Authority by taking into consideration all the facts has concluded that no effort was made by the tenant-petitioner to seek setting aside of the exparte order passed on December 13, 1984 and he had moved the appeal under Sub-Section 2 of Section 15 of the Act, before the Appellate Authority. In support of his view, the learned Appellate Authority has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Muya Devi and Ors. v. Mehria Gram Dali Mill, Hisar and Ors., A.I.R. 1988 Pb.& Hry. 176. The view of the Appellate Authority reads as under:-

Learned counsel for the appellant admitted that in fact he never moved for setting aside of an exparte decree before the learned Rent Controller. Even the appeal is beyond limitation in the sense that the exparte ejectment order had been passed on December 23. 1986 and he has applied for obtaining a copy of the judgment on 23.10.1987 when the limitation has already expired for filing the appeal. It has never been explained as to where diu the appellant remain from the period the exparte order was passed till he applied for a copy. He wasted the entire time and must be knowing, there is no question of the knowledge of the appellant when he himself was contesting the case and suddenly disappeared on 13.12.1984. The exparte decree has been passed two years thereafter. So, it was not a case where the learned Rent Controller acted in a haste or that the appellant did not know anything about the situation or that he did not know the consequences thereof. Sh. O.P. Sharma, Advocate, had been appearing for the appellant. The appellant himself had tendered the rent on 3.8.1984. So, the absence of the appellant has been intentional in the case and he did not appear knowingly for some reason or the other which was in his mind. The appellant did not file any application for setting aside the exparte ejectment order, Straightaway coming in appeal is not feasible according to law as laid down in a case of Smt. Maya Devi and Ors. v. Mehria Gram Dall Mill, Hissar and Ors., A.I.R. 1988 P&H 176, in which it has been laid down as under:-

Where no application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code was moved for setting aside exparte decree, in an appeal against such decree under Section 96 (2) an error defect, or irregularity which has affected the decision of the case can be challenged. Such an appeal cannot be converted into proceedings for setting aside the exparte decree. The Code prescribes the remedy for the setting aside of the exparte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 and when a plea under the said provision under Clause (D) of Rule . 1 of Order XVIII of the Code against an order of the trial Court refusing to set aside the exparte decree. When a particular remedy is provided for setting aside an exparte decree and, there is by way of appeal, another special remedy against an order refusing to set aside such a decree. These remedies alone and none other can be taken resort to. Therefore when these remedies have not been ava