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1984 Supreme(P&H) 85

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
M.R.Sharma and S.S.Kang JJ.
Manoj Ahuja
Versus
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner Of Income-tax, Acquisition Range
First Appeal from the Order No. 138 of 1975,
Decided On : JANUARY 31, 1984

The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to appeals filed under Section 269G of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Headnote:

LIMITATION ACT - CONDONATION OF DELAY - SECTION 5 - APPEAL UNDER SECTION 269G OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 - APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT - COURT'S DISCRETION TO CONDON DELAY IN FILING APPEAL - INTERESTS OF MINORS.

Fact of the Case:

The appellants, minors, filed an appeal under Section 269G of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against an order of acquisition of immovable property made by the competent authority under Section 269F of the Act. The appeal was filed after the period of limitation prescribed under Section 269G(1) of the Act. The appellants filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in presenting the appeal. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the application and the appeal as time-barred.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to appeals filed under Section 269G of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court further held that the Appellate Tribunal erred in dismissing the application for condonation of delay and the appeal as time-barred. The court found that the appellants were minors and that their guardian, who is also an advocate, made a mistake in understanding and applying the law of limitation. The court held that the interests of the minors cannot be allowed to suffer due to the mistake of their guardian.

Issues: 1. Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to appeals filed under Section 269G of the Income Tax Act, 1961? 2. Whether the Appellate Tribunal erred in dismissing the application for condonation of delay and the appeal as time-barred?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Act shall apply to proceedings under any special or local law, unless expressly excluded by such law. 2. The Income Tax Act, 1961 does not expressly exclude the application of the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3. Therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to appeals filed under Section 269G of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 4. The Appellate Tribunal erred in holding that the application for condonation of delay was not competent because it was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation. 5. The Appellate Tribunal also erred in dismissing the appeal as time-barred without considering the merits of the case.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal, and allowed the application for condonation of delay. The court remitted the appeal to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh decision on merits.

Judgment

Sukhdev Singh Kang, J.

1. Whether an appeal under Section 269G of the I.T. Act, 1961 ("the Act" for short), filed against the order of the acquisition of immovable property made by the competent authority under Section 269F of the Act can be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed for such an appeal, if the appellant satisfies the Appellate Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within time, is the short but meaningful question raised in this first appeal from order. Equally at issue is the legality and validity of the order dated March 24, 1975, of the Appellate Tribunal, dismissing the appellants appeal as time-barred.

2. A brief survey of the pertinent facts will illumine the contours of the forensic controversy :

Sarvshri Manoj Ahuja and Sanjay Ahuja, the present appellants, purchased House No. 85, Sector 8-A, Chandigarh. The competent authority made an order dated November 4, 1974, for the acquisition of this property under Sub-section (6) of Section 269F of the Act.

3. The appellants, who are minors, filed an appeal under Section 269G of the Act against this order of the competent authority through Shri H. K. Ahuja, their father and guardian, on December 28, 1974. As mentioned earlier, the order was made on November 4, 1974, and a copy of the said order was served on the appellants on November 24, 1974. The limitation for filing an appeal under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 269G of the Act was 30 days from the date of service of the copy of the order on the appellants. Since the appeal was filed after the period of limitation, the appellants filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , for the condonation of delay in presenting the appeal. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed this application as also the appeal, vide orders dated March 24, 1975, on two grounds :

(a) that the application for condonation of delay was not competent because under the proviso to Section 269G(1) of the Act, such an application should be made before the period for filing the appeal had expired; and

(b) that Shri H. K. Ahuja, the father and natural guardian of appellants, is an advocate and he had been attending the proceedings before the competent authority on behalf of the appellants from time to time. Under these circumstances, it was difficult to hold that Shri H. K. Ahuja was unaware of the provisions of law relating to limitation.

4. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed the present appeal. It will be helpful to read the various relevant statutory provisions at the very threshold : The Limitation Act, 1963 :

"Section 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."

" Section 29. Savings.--(I) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in forc















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